A study of the Mighty Motors operating system : making sustainable improvements at a powertrain manufacturing facility by Dibb, Gregory David, 1974-
A Study of the Mighty Motors Operating System: Making Sustainable
Improvements at a Powertrain Manufacturing Facility
by
Gregory David Dibb
Bachelor of Science, Manufacturing Engineering
Brigham Young University (1999)
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
and to the Department of Mechanical Engineering
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of
Master of Business Administration
and
Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering
in conjunction with the
Leaders for Manufacturing Program
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 2004
The author hereby grants
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUL 0 12004
LIBRARIES
© 2004, GregoryDibb. All rights reserved.
to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this
thesis document in whole or in part.
A //1
. Signature of Author
MIT Sloan School of MA'agdient & MIT Department of Mechanical Engineering
May 6, 2004
Certified by
Certified by
Certified by
Certified by
Accepted by
Accepted by
H Kent Bowen
Professor of Busin ss Administration, Harvard Business School
0%A A /1 A
U7 Deborah Nightingale
Professor of Aeronautics anA4r-aais and Engineejing3ystems Division, MIT
Thomas Roemer
Assist t Professor of Management, MIT Sloan School of Management
Warren Seering
Professor of Mechanical Engineering, MIT
.. " '" S onin, Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Studies
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Margaret Andrews, Director of Master's Program
MIT Sloan School of Management
BARKER
CZ
A Study of the Mighty Motors Operating System: Making
Sustainable Improvements at a Powertrain Manufacturing Facility
by
Gregory David Dibb
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
and to the Department of Mechanical Engineering on May 6, 2004
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of
Master of Business Administration
and
Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering
ABSTRACT
Many manufacturing companies are developing their own production or operating system,
particularly in an effort to duplicate the widely renowned Toyota Production System.
Toyota has demonstrated its potential for improving productivity and profitability. These
same opportunities exist in nearly all companies, manufacturing or otherwise. This thesis
explores the application of a similar operating system for a powertrain manufacturing
company referred to as the Mighty Motors Company. More specifically, this thesis seeks to
discover and explain Mighty Motors' obstacles to making sustainable improvements on the
factory floor.
The conclusions of this thesis are based primarily on the author's firsthand observations at
Mighty Motors' powertrain manufacturing facilities. These data include quotes from
interviews, results from factory floor experiments, and observations from improvement
projects on the factory floor. The data are then sorted into five categories of observations,
which serve as the basis for final recommendations. These five recommendations are
suggested as a course of action to overcome the obstacles to making sustainable
improvements on the factory floor at Mighty Motors:
1. Go to the floor to make firsthand observations. The best quality data regarding a
problem or opportunity on the factory floor is obtained by going to the site in
question on the factory floor.
2. Standardize all activities (by making them highly specified according content,
sequence, timing, and outcome). Standardizing activities in this way improves the
visibility of problems and provides a common basis for improvement.
3. Standardize each link to create one clear, direct, unambiguous signal. Standardizing
links (connections) between activities eliminates ambiguity and waste.
4. Solve every problem and make every improvement in accordance with the A3 and
the scientific method. Following this scientific approach on the factory floor
increases the rate of learning about and improving the processes.
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5. Provide sufficient support to the operators by way of a robust help chain. Constant
support is required to sustain processes and improvements on the factory floor.
These conclusions are then consolidated with the previous models of the Mighty Motors
Operating System to provide one unified model for making sustainable improvements on
the factory floor at Mighty Motors.
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1 The Mighty Motors Operating System Group
1.1 Introduction to Mighty Motors
This thesis is based on my research on making sustainable improvements at a major
powertrain manufacturer. The company is headquartered in the Midwest United States; I
will hereafter refer to it as "Mighty Motors." I performed my research during an on site
internship from May to December of 2003. The site is a powertrain plant of Mighty Motors
that assembles about three hundred powertrains (engines) per day. This chapter will explain
the development of my role as a research fellow at Mighty Motors.
1.2 Introduction to the Mighty Motors Operating System Group
Upon my arrival, I was placed in the recently formed MMOS (Mighty Motors Operating
System) group. This new group was headed by the Vice President of Manufacturing
Excellence. He had recognized the advantages of a standardized operating system similar to
the system profitably employed at Toyota. The President of Mighty Motors had recently
issued a cost reduction initiative setting aggressive goals to cut costs in all operations. The
VP recognized the possibility of a Toyota-like operating system's facilitating the
accomplishments of those goals.
On my first day at Mighty Motors, I arrived at the same that this group was starting a
meeting to address this cost cutting initiative. I joined the group in a conference room and
met both Dan and Andy. Dan's role focused on the CI (continuous improvement) side of
9
MMOS, and Andy was responsible for the accounting side. For the duration of my stay at
Mighty Motors, Dan served as my supervisor and mentor. I began my involvement by
shadowing him on several of his already existing I projects.
1.3 The Mighty Motors Operating System four high-level philosophies
I learned that the purpose of the MMOS group was to take current world-class best practices
in manufacturing, combine them with Mighty Motors culture, and develop a new MMOS
philosophy to spread throughout the company. At the time of my arrival, I learned that
MMOS was defined as "A way of thinking about the way we do work and the way we do
change." MMOS was further broken down into four high-level philosophies which
explained the differences with our traditional way of doing things. These philosophies were
developed by the VP and head of the MMOS group while working with a consultant: Mr.
Ohba, one of the founders of Toyota's ThSC (Toyota Supplier Support Center) group. The
philosophies are stated in four simple points. During my time at Mighty Motors and while
writing this thesis I came to appreciate that though they were simple, their influence was
profound. I list them here as I first learned them from the group's presentation slide (Figure
1-1):
* Go See the Problem
* Continuous Improvement Everyone, Everyday
* People are Key
* One by One Approach to Customer Demand
10
A way of thinking about how we....
Figure 1-1 The four high-level MMOS philosophies
Most of the conclusions drawn in this thesis relate to these points. These four philosophies
are considered Mighty Motors' ideal for how the company should think about doing work
and doing change. But we all recognized the gap between where we were then (action) and
where we hoped to be (the ideal = philosophies and principles). (see Figure 1-2) So the
group began to look for ways to help the company overcome this gap.
11
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The MMOS Journey
You There is no
are finish line
here
MMOS Philosophies I
Principles
Gap
Action
Figure 1-2 The MMOS journey to fill the gap between action and ideal
1.4 The Mighty Motors Change Model
Soon after my arrival, Kim, a specialist in change management, joined us as the fourth
member of the team. As a training initiative Kim and the Vice President conducted what
were called "Kick-start Sessions" throughout the company in order to raise awareness of
these new philosophies. These sessions included some manufacturing role-play simulations
where participants "manufactured" products out of paper in a model "factory." The kick-
starts were very popular, and they seemed to successfully teach the participants about new
ways to think about "doing work and doing change."
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chitecture
Figure 1-3 The Basic MMOS Change Model
While these kick-start sessions were successful at getting employees to see things differently,
we recognized we needed a more specific strategy to get the changes done on the factory
floor- to overcome that gap between philosophy and action. To accomplish this, we
created the "MMOS Change Model" (see Figure 2-3). Dan developed the initial model, and
the group worked to modify it and add detail. Figure 3 displays the basic model after several
iterations. (Glusick)
Table 1-1 Steps of HDOS Change Model
Step of Change Model Description Pertaining primarily to
System, Activities, or Links
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Sustainability Once improvements have been made System
and the process is stabilized, support
the process to prevent deterioration
of the measured improvement.
Establish Stability A cycle of stabilizing a process, Activities and Links
<--> Create/Improve making a measured improvement to
Flow improve flow, then again stabilizing
the process.
Prepare the People Developing relationships with the System
people and an atmosphere conducive
to change.
Joint Leadership The commitment of both System
Commitment management and union leadership to
make improvements.
This model is meant to help a manager who wants to change his/her factory to know what
basic stages are involved in making a change. The stages are listed sequentially starting at the
bottom and following the arrows up to the next step. Each step also points to a part of the
diagram on the right, which represents the entire factory, or its overall system architecture.
The operations of a factory can be classified as actiziei and links and arranged according to
the system design. The actiews are the processes that add value to the product; the links are
the processes connecting the activities. The system includes the entire area and the way those
activities and links are organized and managed. Each stage in the change model pertains to
one specific part of the system architecture as displayed by the arrow.
Using this change model as a base, we worked as a group to define "deeper meanings" for
each step and to develop detailed training modules for a corporate training plan. Initially we
made lists of tools, methods, and initiatives including philosophies such as Quality and Six
Sigma, Theory of Constraints, Toyota Production System, Lean Manufacturing, and more.
We attempted to categorize each tool or philosophy into training modules for company
classes. The table below presents the more detailed version of the change model with the
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related tools and principles listed next to each step. (I present the table here as it was
developed- a comprehensive explanation of the tools and principles listed is beyond the
scope of this thesis. I list them here to simply demonstrate the development of the model.)
We realized that many of the philosophies and tools we listed seemed to contradict each
other in their application, and considered how do manage those conflicts. Kim has since
been working with other departments and outside consultants to further develop this list,
decide the content of the modules, and develop the corporate training plan.
Table 1-2 Tools and principles of steps in MMOS Change Model
Sten of Change Model Related tools and DrinciDles
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Sustainability 0 Managing the transition
" To Involve or Not To Involve?
* Elements of trust & respect
" Who, what, when, where, why &
how-to involve
" Commitments for personal
accountability
" How/Why hold others accountable
* Triggers & Metrics
Establish Stability <--> Value stream mapping
Create/Improve Flow 0 5S
0 kanban
0 six sigma
0 Standardized work
0 1 piece flow
* cell design
" pull systems/ marketplace design
" A-3
" Quick changeover
" Quality @ the source
" Visual management
" Error-proofing
* Level loading
" Takt time
* Performance measures / statistical
'
analysis
* Line balancing
" Time study analysis
" TPM & PM
" Problem solving techniques
_ Spaghetti diagrams
Prepare the People * WIIFM (What's in it for me)
* TWI (Training within industry)
" Examples of success
" Communication System
" Reward System
" The core of relationships
" The core of C
" Value vs. Waste
" Recognize & Understand Wastes
Joint Leadership Commitment o Coaching
" Socratic method
" "Why" technique
" Change levers
" Culture, history, & resistance
" Roles & Responsibilities
" Motivation and reinforcement
" Encourage Cl activity
1.5 Getting involved on the factory floor
The focus of my role as a research fellow at Mighty Motors began to shift to changes on the
factory floor. I began supporting Dan and others in some Continuous Improvement
projects and to lead some projects of my own. By working on these hands-on projects, I
hoped to make observations through the lens of our change model and in the process
discover valuable lessons for use in its future development. I was not disappointed; this
learn-by-doing approach provided me with experiences and findings that we had not
previously considered. I present my findings--experiences, observations, and conclusions--in
this thesis.
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I began getting involved on the floor by supporting some already existing continuous
improvement projects. I helped in the powder-coat area, where parts were powder-coated
(painted) before going to be machined. I participated in machining areas, both in the
Aluminum and Steel groups. I worked on projects on the Assembly line and in the
Diversified Products Group; I helped on some Engineering and Quality projects as well.
During my time at Mighty Motors I was exposed to nearly all of the manufacturing
operations on site. Mighty Motors was very gracious in giving me opportunities to explore,
observe, and support various projects. During my internship I also visited seven other
Mighty Motors manufacturing or assembly facilities located around the country.
1.6 Previously Implemented MMOS tools
What I observed in these initial visits surprised me. Nearly everywhere in the factories,
(especially at my home site) I saw MMOS tools being implemented and utilized. I saw the
application of nearly every tool we had included in our detailed change model (see Table
1-2): six sigma, kanbans, just-in-time, U-shaped cells, value stream maps, etc. Their use was
not universal, but it was pervasive. It became obvious to me that the Mighty Motors
employees were not uninformed about the use of these tools. At this point the purpose of
my research and support became less clear- it appeared the goal of implementing these
tools was already underway through various other initiatives.
I began to look into the applications of these MMOS tools and analyze how they were
employed and what their results were. This more detailed analysis of the projects leading to
the implementation of these tools brought me to the realization that came to be the basis of
my research.
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1.7 The flywheel machining cell improvement project
The first example I explored was the flywheel machining cell that I had been shown on my
first tour of the factory. The flywheels raw castings arrived at this cell to be machined and
assembled before passed on for final assembly with the powertrain. This machining cell had
recently undergone a major improvement project involving several engineers, managers,
operators, and consultants. Two large bulletin boards displaying the history of the project
stood just outside the cell. The boards explained the previous flywheel process: The
flywheels would move through the factory in job-shop style (see Figure 1-4 The flow path
of flywheels before (above) and after (below)), passing from one machining group to the
next, then returning to the first, and back again before being assembled. As is true in most
job-shop operations, the plant layout had been organized by machining group: lathes
together, drills together, presses together, etc. And it was accompanied with high inventories
and long lead-times.
18
Previous Flow Path of Flywheels
(Job-shop example)
Start
Finish
New Flow Path of Flywheels
(U-shaped example)
I I -
Figure 1-4 The flow path of flywheels before (above) and after (below)
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-The signs then described how the project team redesigned the entire process and
reorganized to create the now existing U-shaped-cell. Now the machines were aligned side-
by-side in order according to the sequential machining and assembly processes of the
flywheels (Figure 1-4). This was an exemplaryMMOS project that took existing proven
tools and applied them to make a measured improvement on the factory floor. Efficiencies
were vastly improved by cutting down on non-value added activities such as transporting
and waiting. In fact, the numbers were posted on the signs, showing drastic reductions
realized in inventory from 2,400 to 27 parts and lead-times from 3-4 months to one day.
Figure 1-5 The lead-time and the inventory increased with time after the
improvement event
However, the signs seemed to explain processes that were different than those I observed
being performed in the cell. The operators were working hard, but some of their work did
20
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not align with that described on the signs. For example according to the new design, parts
were supposed to move straight from machine # 2 to machine # 3 with no buffer in
between--but I observed a stack of partially machined flywheels between the two machines.
I realized that although the cell may have run according to design with one day lead-times
immediately after the event, it was possible that for whatever reason it no longer was as
efficient. In fact, according to my observations, the inventory and lead-times had increased
150% to 63 parts and two and a half days, respectively. (Figure 1-5)
Admittedly a lead-time of 2.5 days is still drastically better than 3 months, but the fact is that
the metrics were moving in the wrong direction- the improvements were deteriorating. In
reality, the area was running at lead-times one and a half times longer than that which it has
been proven capable of running. In any other area a lead-time nduaion of that same 1.5 days
would certainly be cause for more celebration. But here, after the celebration, the process
somehow digressed that much without significant detection. The initial project brought
about a huge change and improved the area drastically. But now the area was straying from
its designed output. The improvements were not being sustained.
21
As it turns out, I found other examples of MMOS tools that had been implemented on the
factory floor but their results had not been maintained, let alone continuously improved (see
Figure 1-6).
MMS
Figure 1-6 The performance achieved immediately after the improvement
project deteriorated with time
This flywheel example was the easiest to calculate because the initial numbers were posted
right there in the area for all to see. Other examples showed less obvious but similar
deteriorations, some of which I will present in the following chapters.
1.8 Lack of Sustainability
I evaluated my discovery through the lens of our Change Model (figure 2-3). The last step in
the model, "Sustainability" seemed to be incomplete. Why? How was it that well-designed
22
Improvement Decay
Decline
CI Projec
Time
tools could be implemented in an area and make immediate improvements, but that those
improvements would begin to disappear over time?
I discussed my findings with my supervisor, Dan (as I did throughout my time there- he has
been extremely helpful in guiding me in my research). We realized that most all of the
improvement work we saw in the factory involved only part of the third step of the change
model: "Create / Improve Flow." Most of the improvements I observed were the
implementation of some tool to systematically improve flow. But the other steps of the
model were significantly less visible. Admittedly, "Leadership Commitment" and "Prepare
the People" are likely by their nature less visible than product flow improvements in a
factory--but at the same time, what system, organizational or leadership (people) changes
should be accompanying changes on the floor? I hypothesized that the lack of sustainability
came from a secondary focus on the first preparatory steps of the change model,
"Leadership Commitment" and "Prepare the People."
23
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Figure 1-7 Insufficient focus on "Joint Leadership Commitment" and
"Prepare the People" may lead to lack of "Sustainability"
These steps relate specifically to the system architecture as a whole-the entire process of
making and sustaining a changed system rather than just one activity or link. This would
involve organizational and support structures, change management methods, leadership
paradigms, etc. I decided to focus my observations on these first steps-to see what system
issues were involved in limiting sustainability.
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2 Research Methodology
2.1 Collection of data through projects on factory floor
In doing my research I approached the collection and analysis of data in various ways. This
chapter presents the methods I used to collect and analyze the data involved. Much of my
data is qualitative. As previously mentioned, I quickly learned that my most valuable
observations were from my time spent on the factory floor involved in the work. This
hands-on approach remained my primary source of data collection. I continued to support
C[ projects and began to lead some of my own. One of the values that I expected to add
was an unbiased set of eyes and ears. As a newcomer to Mighty Motors I hoped to provide
a more objective point of view with the ability to see things outside of the normal company
paradigms.
I collected data while working with teams on several projects:
" Planning a new layout for the crankcase machining area
* Resolving quality problems with an oil pressure switch
* Revamping scheduling in powder-coat
" Designing inventory supermarkets for cylinders and cylinder heads
* Improving parts delivery in several assembly stations
* Consolidating two assembly cells into a small assembly line
" Developing a scheduling system for paint line
" Improving ergonomics in the flywheel assembly area
* Defining MMOS change model and training modules
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* Standardizing the inventory labeling system
" Streamlining work of material handlers
" Analyzing the value stream for connecting rods
* Rearranging two assembly line stations.
2.2 Other methods of data collection
In addition to supporting these projects in the factory, I also collected data through other
methods. For example I had brief opportunities to work some operators' jobs (courtesy of
that particular operator). I seldom did so for more than a few cycles, but each occasion was
enlightening. I also conducted interviews with engineers and managers to collect data about
their recent improvement projects. By searching existing literature I looked for comparisons
to benchmark companies. I chose the Toyota Company to be my primary benchmark.
Toyota has been widely regarded as the benchmark in manufacturing, and papers and
literature abound for easy comparisons.
2.3 Shop notebooks
Through the day-to-day process of all my research and data collection I have kept careful
notes on my shop notebooks. As a result, I have four notebooks with about sixty pages
each full of observations, quotes, interviews, and thoughts. These two hundred and forty
pages have served primarily as the source of recorded data for this thesis.
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2.4 The Language Processing Method
I analyzed and evaluated this data by a process called "the language processing method," or
"CU," as presented in the book The Language PnxssingMethod- A Tod for OC nizing Qualiatie
Data and CrtingInight (Center for Quality Management). The LP provided a way for me to
organize the data from my research at Mighty Motors and derive conclusions from then.
Following is a summary of the process:
1. Theme. First I defined the theme- the theme is the question that I was trying to
answer "What are our obstacles to making sustainable improvements on the
factory floor at Mighty Motors powertrains?"
2. Fact recording and Card scrubbing. I transferred data from shop notebooks to
cards. Each observation or quote that helped elucidate the theme was written on
its own card. These sentences were then scrubbed to ensure that they
a. Contained only one idea
b. Were on the same low level of abstraction
c. Contained only fact-based language.
3. First-level grouping. Next I took forty-seven of the most applicable cards and
grouped them intuitively according to their common thread. These common
threads were found by creating a mental image of each card and obtaining the
essence of its meaning from that image. Those cards with strong linkages were
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then grouped together.
Figure 2-1 Groupings of forty seven cards containing data from the factory
floor
4. First-level titles. I wrote a title for each of the twenty-one groups to convey the
common thread or meaning in that group, and stacked each card under. its
corresponding title.
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Figure 2-2 Cards consolidated under first level titles
5. Second and Third level grouping and titles. I then repeated the grouping,
increasing the level of abstraction each time until I had only five groups
remaining. The title of each group now conveyed the summary meaning of every
card in its group.
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Figure 2-3 Picture of my final Language Processing diagram
2.5 The five conclusions from my observations
The five titles of these final five groups serve as categories that comprise all of my
observations on the factory floor. They are the basis for my conclusions in helping to
answer the theme question: "What are our obstacles to making sustainable improvements on
the factory floor at Mighty Motors powertrains?"
1. Sometimes more time is spent discussing problems in meetings than on the floor
observing them.
2. Some aspects of the operator's work are not clearly defined or standardized.
3. The ownership of or responsibility for some tasks is not clear.
4. The operator and the manager expect different outcomes from a change.
5. The operator does not receive immediate or frequent support unless the problem
is severe.
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These five categories also serve as the structure of this thesis. Each of the five chapters that
follow is devoted to one of these five categories. Within these chapters I discuss the
observations that led to that conclusion, a comparison with other observations, a detailed
explanation of the conclusion that resulted, and benchmark examples from supporting
literature.
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3 Go See the Problem
"A desk is a dangerous place from which to view the world" -- John LeCarre
3.1 Learning about the factory
This chapter presents the data and discussion pertaining to the first category of observations:
"Sometimes more time is spent discussing problems in meetings than on the floor observing
then." When I first began my research at MightyMotors, I asked a TPS expert about how
to best learn about the Toyota Production System. He responded by asking me a series of
questions: How did I suppose he had learned about TPS? How did Toyota discover it? As
I studied various methods of learning, I concluded that the best way to learn about
manufacturing is on the manufacturing floor at the site of the activities. Some experiences
from the very beginning helped reinforce this concept.
3.2 Un-honed cylinders issue
One of my first projects was working to resolve a quality problem in the cylinders machining
area. A "Corporate Action Request" (CAR) had been made to escalate the issue. As a
result, an official worksheet was issued with the description of the problem and an action
plan was to be made to resolve it. The description of the CAR issue was: "The Assembly
line is receiving several un-honed cylinders from the machining group on a daily basis."
Before reaching the assembly line, the cylinders are passed through a series of steps in the
cylinder machining area. The last step in that area before the final wash is the honing of the
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inside of the cylinder; this honing smoothes out the inside and prepares it for assembly.
According to the CAR, the cylinders assemblers on the line were receiving cylinders from
machining that had somehow not been appropriately honed and were therefore not suitable
for assembly (non-conforming material).
UME"
Figure 3-1 The cylinders machining process flow
I was invited to the first meeting along with two supervisors, a manager, an engineer, a
quality manager, and a union representative. During the one and a half hour meeting, each
of us brainstormed for ideas on how to solve the problem of sending un-honed cylinders to
the assembly line. We made a list of ideas including solutions such as:
* Adding a lamp to improve visibility
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" Laser etching or somehow marking each cylinder that had been honed for
unmistakable identification
" Organizing a meeting with the operators to explain and discuss the problem
* Installing a sign above the carts reminding operators to check for un-honed
parts.
Assignments were made to check on the feasibility of each solution, and an appointment was
set to meet again the following week. During the days that followed I spent some time in
the area documenting how the process actually ran and looking for possible undiscovered
roots to the problem.
Over the course of a few days I witnessed three different scenarios that resulted in un-honed
cylinders:
1. Upon observing and sketching the flow of the cylinders (Figure 3-2), I discovered
that the flow paths were potentially confusing as the honed and un-honed cylinders
cross each other at the table between the Final Wash and the Hone. With such a
complex flow path, occasionally the operator would pick up an un-honed cylinder
(that had just come from the bore{2} and not yet been to the hone{3}) and place it
on the final wash{4}, after which it would be placed with finished parts ready for the
assembly line.
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Figure 3-2 Observed pathway of parts in cylinders machining area
This was an easy mistake to make because the same small table was used to store
both honed and un-honed cylinders which could easily be confused. In fact, the
possibility that someone could repeat that process 300 times a shift without
switching the cylinders was impressive if not unlikely.
2. While I was in the area, the operator pulled a cylinder of the honing machine and
showed me a problem he occasionally encountered: "Look-this has happened
before--sometimes this machine only hones it part-way. The edges get honed, but
for some reason the middle does not." He showed me in the light how by careful
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Flow of cylinders in machining area
table
inspection one could see the half-completed operation. (see Figure 3-3)
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Figure 3-3 Partially un-honed cylinders
He suggested the error had something to do with metal shavings interfering with the
clamping procedure. This cylinder was evidence that although the part be loaded
properly in the honing machine, it can still result in an improperly honed cylinder.
3. The honing tool is started with touch sensors. The operator touches each finger to
one of two sensors simultaneously, and the machine cycles. The cylinders are loaded
through the open door of the tool onto a circular platter that holds six parts at a
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I
time. (see Figure 3-4)
Figure 3-4 The honing tool with its rotating platter
I observed that after loading a cylinder in position # 1 of the Honing platter, the
operator would touch his fingers to the sensors to start the machine, then turn to the
Bore {2} machine (see figure) to load and unload it. After unloading the Bore, the
operator would then load and unload the final wash {4}. He/she would then return
to the Hone {3} just in time to unload the next finished part, which should be on
the platter having just moved from position # 6 to position # 1. I witnessed an
occasion where the machine did not trigger with the touch of the operator's fingers,
and when the operator returned he picked up the exact part that had just been placed
there and had not been honed and was about to load it into the final wash with other
finished parts. At the last minute the operator noticed the cylinder was un-honed
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and returned it to the machine to be loaded again. If the operator had not
recognized the error, an un-honed cylinder would have moved to the assembly
station.
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I observed each of these instances over a period of a few days with time in that cylinders
area totaling about six hours. During the six hours that I spent observing in the honing area,
I personally witnessed three scenarios pointing to possible root causes that we had not
discussed in our meeting.
Time spent analyzing un-honed
cylinders problem
12
10
01
0
E
I
8
6
4
2
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Figure 3-5 Comparison of time spent analyzing un-honed cylinders problem
The meeting had pooled the resources of seven people for one and a half hours totaling ten
and a half human-hours of work time. Yet these human-hours produced solutions to treat
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the problem without specifically identifying observed root causes of the problen. These
root causes of the problem which I observed were only identified by going to see the
problem by firsthand observation on the floor.
3.3 Crankcase machining issue
In a similar example I was involved in a discussion with three other engineers regarding a
failure that had occurred in the crankcase machining area. While machining a part, the tool
had cut right into one of its own clamps- scrapping the part, breaking the tool bit, and
damaging the clamp. There was some debate among the group about which clamp had been
damaged and what part was loaded at the time. Some sketches were drawn, some drawings
were referenced, and for thirty minutes we theorized as to the specifics of the incident.
After this time spent discussing the issue, the senior engineer stopped and said, "Well what
are we all standing around talking about it for? Let's go to the floor and look at it!" Two of
us grabbed our safety glasses, went down the stairs to the shop floor, and walked about 80
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meters to the crankcase machining area.
Figure 3-6 Path from office area to machining area
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There we found the operator who had been running the machine at the time of the failure
and began to visit him. Within ten minutes he had explained to us what had happened and
showed us the damaged clamp, the part that had been loaded, and the tool-bit that was
broken.
Time spent analyzing crankcase incident
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Figure 3-7 Comparison of time spent analyzing crankcase issue
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3.4 Connecting rods flow
I compare these two examples with my experience at a half-day management conference on
site. During most of the conference the twenty managers met in a conference room and
discussed MMOS. Presentations were made regarding current projects and best practices
were shared. After some presentations, my supervisor, Dan, stood and began to explain
some work we were doing to streamline the flow of connecting rods in the factory. These
parts had a job-shop type flow (see Figure 3-8) similar to the flywheels' flow described in
Chapter 2. After some explanation, Dan led us all out of the conference room onto the
factory floor. "During this exercise, imagine that you are a connecting rod with a customer
waiting for you" he suggested. Then we proceeded to walk the path of the part flow.
Figure 3-8 Flow path of connecting rods
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We walked at least a quarter mile, and including the short explanations at each station it took
us nearly an hour to complete. (This hour was just for transportation time- no processing
or wait time was accounted for) At the end of the conference each attendee offered
feedback on their experience. Invariably they named the "on the floor experience" as the
most enlightening part of the meeting. One manager explained why: "Walking that entire
path was really eye-opening. It helped me understand what's really going on. I'm sure I
must have similar processes at my plant but I'd never actually walked the path."
3.5 Firsthand observation
In each of these experiences the most success was gained by going to the site of the activity--
by close firsthand observation rather than by distant theoretical discussion. Both methods
are utilized at work, but in my research I found that the time spent on the floor in
observation was significantly more productive than the time spent in a meeting in discussion.
Through benchmarking and literature review, I found several examples that support this
conclusion.
3.6 The Fishbowl concept
In his book Languge Pnxessing Professor Shiba calls this principle "The fishbowl concept."
He teaches that in order to fully understand a problem, one must first immerse themselves in
it, similar to swimming with the goldfish rather than just watching through glass. Once we
"swim with the fish" and expose ourselves to a topic from many vantage points our
understanding improves. (Center for Quality of Management 9)
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3.7 Go to Gemba
Masaaki Imai also explains the importance of this principle in his book Genba Kizen. The
Japanese word "gemba" means "real place"- or in a manufacturing context where the
products are actually formed- on the factory floor. He describes how at successful
companies, managers know firsthand the axiom "Go to gemba first"
"As a matter of routine, managers and supervisors should immediately go to the site
and stand in one spot attentively observing what goes on ... Gemba is a source of all
information ... to qualify as a Toyota man, one must love gemba, and that every
Toyota employee believes gemba is the most important place in the company...
Taiichi Ohno is credited with having developed the Toyota Production System.
When Ohno noticed a supervisor out of touch with the realities of gemba, he would
take the supervisor to the plant, draw a circle, and have the supervisor stand in it
until he gained awareness. Ohno urged managers, too, to visit gemba. He would
say, 'Go to gemba everyday."' (Imai 14-16)
I found interesting similarities in the sociological classic Stwet Corr Soaiety between the
author's study of the community of Comerville and a manger's study of her factory floor.
"The only way to gain this knowledge [intimate knowledge of local life] is to live in
Cornerville and participate in the activities of its people. One who does that finds that the
district reveals itself to him in an entirely different light" (Whyte xv-xvi)
My three examples suggest that more time is spent in meetings discussing rather than on the
floor observing or experimenting. Yet the examples show that the desired outcomes were
obtained through the time spent observing on the floor. This is not to suggest that no time
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should be spent in meetings. Most every meeting I attended yielded positive benefits that
contributed to the project. But when the project pertained to a matter specific to the floor,
in my experience we tended to over-extend our discussing in conference rooms while
allocating less time for problem-solving onsite. The reminder of the importance of going
onsite for firsthand observation is the purpose of the MMOS philosophy "Go see the
problem."
3.8 Proximity affects frequency of interaction
Studies by MIT professor Tom Allen explore the relationship between the distance of
workers and the level of interaction between them. The study shows that the more distance
between their workspaces, the less they communicate. In fact, once a distance of fifty
meters separates the workspace of two coworkers, their communication is not significantly
more frequent than their communication with workers in an entirely different building! This
study of human interaction gives supporting evidence for the natural tendency of our group
to stay in the office (which is separate from the factory floor) discussing the problem rather
than to walk the eighty meters to observe the problem.
3.9 The parable of the magic rock
How does this affect the sustainability of improvements? I can not explain it better than to
share the parable of the magic rock
A farmer who had been losing money year after year went to a banker. He asked for
a loan to keep the farm open for another year. The banker reluctantly agreed, saying
"I can no longer afford to lose money on you. Either you show a profit this year or
we will repossess the farm."
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Upon leaving the bank with a new loan, the farmer was confronted by a panhandler
who asked the farmer if he needed help. The farmer said he needed a lot of luck to
get through the coming year. The panhandler offered the farmer a lucky stone for a
small price, payable at the end of the year. The panhandler said the payment was
required only if the farm did indeed turn a profit. The farmer, seeing that he couldn't
lose, asked for the conditions of the agreement. The panhandler said the stone is
effective only if the farmer walked his property every day with the stone in his
pocket. The farmer, willing to try anything, took the stone and went home.
The next morning, the farmer walked his fence line and realized that ten of his cattle
had wandered through a broken fence. He rounded up the cattle, herded them back
into the field, and repaired the fence.
The following morning he found a fox hole and laid a trap for the fox. The fox was
caught. That evening, the farmer and his wife enjoyed a fine meal of fox stew. On
the third day he found a hole in the chicken coop and repaired it to keep his chickens
in. On the next day he spotted some soil erosion and placed rocks near the area to
keep the soil from wasting away.
Day after day, he walked his property with the stone in his pocket and, day after day,
he corrected what needed to be corrected. At the end of the year, the farmer went to
the banker and informed him that it was the most profitable year ever. The banker,
pleased by the farmer's new-found prosperity, asked him how he did it. "I didn't do
anything," the farmer said. "I had a magic rock"
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Upon leaving the bank, the panhandler asked the farmer how the year went. The
fanner told him it was the best year he'd ever had. The farmer paid the panhandler
for the lucky rock and said he would carry the stone with him every day until he died.
The panhandler confessed that the rock wasn't lucky, it was simply that the farmer
was finally doing the things he should have been doing all along, inspecting [going to
see] his workspaces. (Duncan)
3.10 Going to see the problem helps sustain improvements
In this example the farmer, by walking around his workspaces, began to see things he had
not seen before. He saw problems that arose and root causes of those problems. He
leamed why he was losing livestock and was able to fix the root of the problem. He saw soil
being eroded and took steps to stop the erosion. The problems this farmer faced are similar
to those faced at Mighty Motors. By spending more time in the workspaces--at the site of
the activities- one is more likely to witness the real problems and observe their true causes.
Firsthand observation provides a better viewpoint and better firsthand data to solve those
problems and prevent them from hurting sustainable improvements.
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4 Standardized Activities
"What is supposed to happen on a normal day?" - Dan Glusick
4.1 Observations of non-standard work
In this chapter I discuss the category of observations that "Some aspects of the operator's
work are not clearly defined or standardized." I discovered in my investigations that some
aspects of the operators' work are not clearly defined or standardized. I noticed differences
in how the work was done- sometimes across shifts, sometimes in the same shift--tasks
were performed differently. Following are some examples that I observed and
complications that resulted.
4.2 Variation in cylinders machining area
While I was working on the un-honed cylinders project, I spent time documenting the
cylinders machining process. I observed that operator number one would remove finished
parts from the hone and load them directly on the final wash. Operator number two
removed finished parts from the hone, placed them on the table, grabbed un-machined parts
to load in the hone, and then returned to place the honed part on the final wash. Sometimes
however, when the table was full of parts, the operator would skip that step and place them
directly on the final wash. These differences in procedure made it difficult to understand and
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map out the flow of the area.
Figure 4-1 The usual flow of cylinders in the machining area varied
While I was able to witness some actual incidents during my observation of the area, the
high variability in procedure made it difficult to clearly define the current state and identify
what variation was random and what had a specific cause.
In another part of the cylinders machining area I observed an example of variation in the
process. In the designed process the cylinder passes through the first wash on a conveyer, is
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Figure 4-2 The designed flow for the cylinders machining area
blower at the end before the operator retrieves the part, loads it into the Bore, then unloads
it and places it on the table (while loading the next one) before moving it to the Hone. In
contrast to this designed process, however, the operators take the part from the wash, move
it past the bore to a hose where they manually blow it off, place it on a stack of other
previously dried parts.
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Figure 4-3 The operator-adjusted flow for the cylinders machining area
I asked them why they used the manual blower (which is actually designed for blowing off
the tool after each operation); they explained that the built-in blower was broken so they
used the hose instead. A few weeks later one of the operators complained about elbow and
wrist pain, and he was visited by the ergonomics engineer. The manual drying of parts with
air hose was identified as the root of the problem, and the operator took two days off
injured leave. Soon after, the built-in blower was fixed and the designed process returned to
normal.
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4.3 Non-standard loading of parts in highlighting area
In another example I saw an operator loading parts onto the tool highlighting tool. During
the loading of each part he placed a little piece of paper between it and the fixture. The
operator explained that the paper was to trigger the parts sensor which didn't trigger with the
part alone as it was designed. This additional step added on by the operator added five
seconds to a ten second loading process.
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Figure 4-4 Working differently than designed affected the cycle time
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4.4 Non-standard process in flywheels area
As I explained in Chapter one, the flywheel cell had some deviations from the standard
operating procedure as well. While I was in the area, one of the operators left his machine
to help an operator in another area with a problem. The worker that remained continued to
make and stack parts before the absent operator's machine, even though the design was for a
buffer of no more than three parts. When I asked why, the operator responded, "I know I
could just wait and do nothing, but I don't want to just stand here- I want to work"
4.5 Non-standard process in carburetor assembly area
I observed a similar non-standard process on the assembly line. The process design required
that assembler # 1 assemble carburetors while assembler # 2 mount the carburetors onto the
engine. I observed that when assembler # 2 fell behind with her work, assembler # 1 left his
station to help his neighbor (assembler # 2) by performing the first step of her process.
4.6 Non-standard changes in process cause unexpected results
These examples show how deterioration can arise in a process: the operators encounter an
unexpected problem, develop a work-around to continue production, and continue working
in this new unplanned, non-standard way. This leads to a wandering from the existing
process- the designed process is not sustained.
Table 4-1 Designed standard work compared to non-standard adjusted
work
Example Planned, Designed Result Non-Standard Adjusted
Result
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4.7 Definition of standardized work
Spear and Bowen explain that specifically designed work is one of the four implicit rules at
Toyota. The first rule is:
"All work shall be highly specified as to content, sequence, timing, and outcome ...
Toyota's managers recognize that the devil is in the details; that's why they ensure
that all work is highly specified as to content, sequence, timing, and outcome."
(Spear and Bowen 98-99)
TSSC emphasizes the importance of creating work so that it can be specifically repeated.
They define "standardized work" as "the most efficient work flow considering safety,
quality, quantity, and cost." It is considered one of the three foundations to the Toyota
Production systen. (Ohba and Kuhlman-Voss)
It is important to recognize the difference between what is sometimes referred to as
standardized work, or standards, and what Toyota defines to be standardized work. The
following table from TSSC (Table 4-2) explains the differences. (Kuhlman-Voss)
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Cylinders Wash & Dry 3 seconds of handling per 15 seconds of handling per
cycle, no safety or ergonomic cycle, personal injury issues
issues
Cylinders Highlighting 10 second loading time 15 second loading time
Flywheel Machining Buffer of 3 parts Buffer of 10 parts
Carburetor Assembly 1 person mounting 2 people mounting
carburetors carburetors
Table 4-2 Comparison of Standardized work, Standard work, and work
standards
Standardized Work # Standard work or Work standards
Standardized Work Standard Work Work Standard
Purpose Most efficient Cost assignment, Guideline for quality
considering safety, standard efficiency, and safety
quality, quantity, cost piece work incentive
Responsibility Team leader / Industrial Quality and Safety
Group leader Engineering Engineering
Flexibility to Change High- change with Medium- requires Low-
motion and machine reevaluation by Requires changes to
kaizen, layout Industrial quality specifications
changes, Takt time Engineering and or safety standards
changes Cost Accounting
In the Mighty Motors examples cited previously, many of the processes had work standards,
but they were not highly specified according to content, sequence, timing and outcome as
truly standardized work should be. The non-specified work led to deviations from the
intended output. Ironically, most of the changes to the processes were made by the
operators in an effort to inpmze production. These changes were made while reacting to a
sudden problem or obstacle. But in overcoming the obstacle, the procedure changed from
the designed process.
4.8 Advantages of standardized work
Most often, the changes that are made by operators are not noticed and their results are not
measured. When these changes go unnoticed over time they can add undetected variation
and affect production. One advantage of standardized work is that it becomes immediately
clear when the work strays from the design. The operator can easily detect changes in
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his/her expected outcome, and the outside observer can easily observe when the process
strays from the design.
If the process allows for differences, then the operator can make non-designed, unplanned
changes to the process without the immediate awareness of others. For example when an
operator begins (unsupported) to press bearings with gloves because he can operate faster
without removing them, how does he/she know how it affects quality? How long would it
take the quality inspectors further down the line to figure out that a newly found problem is
caused by coolant from a distant operator's occasionally wet gloves? The operator would be
optimizing his process locally (like a productive operator without highly specific work
would), but without the awareness and support of management those changes could be
inadvertently harming the overall system.
Another problem with non-standardized work is that it allows variability that hinders the
understanding of the process: For example the operator of the first shift stacks large buffers
of flywheels but also removes his gloves. The operator on the second shift machines
flywheels one by one with no buffer of parts but uses wet gloves. When rust is found on the
flywheels, which is the cause? Due to the multiple variations in processes the factors are
confounded. Assuming the problem is discovered, the cause is then not as easily determined
among highly variable work.
Toyota recognizes these benefits of standardized work, as Spear and Bowen explain:
"All this variation translates into poorer quality, lower productivity, and higher costs.
More important, it hinders learning and improvement in the organization because the
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variations hide the link between how the work is done and the results. At Toyota's
plants, because operators (new and old, junior and supervisory) follow a well-defined
sequence of steps for a particular job, it is instantly clear when they deviate from the
specifications." (Spear and Bowen 98-99)
4.9 Standardized work for sustainable improvements
Standardized work is also a necessary foundation for future improvement: . . . it is
impossible to improve any process until it is standardized. If the process is shifting from
here to there, then any improvement will just be one more variation that is occasionally used
and mostly ignored. One must standardize, and thus stabilize the process, before
continuous improvements can be made." (Liker 142)
When a problem is encountered with the process as in the above Mighty Motors examples, it
is crucial to understand if this came from the designed process. The process is believed to
produce defect free results; this assumption must be verified. To test this, the following
questions should be asked: "Did it happen because we did not have a standard? Did it
happen because the standard was not followed? Or did it happen because the standard was
not adequate?" (Imai 6)
The question was developed at Mighty Motors to address this issue: "What is supposed to
happen on a normal day?" We realized that unless we could answer this question in specific
detail, we were unable to completely understand a problem or to significantly improve an
area.
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In this chapter I have presented examples where a lack of a highly specified process allowed
for changes to be made to the system that hindered the desired output. In some of these
examples there was no specifically defined standard to limit the variation. In others there
was a specific standard but procedures drifted from that standard. Having established that a
standardized process is crucial to sustaining improvements, how is this standard maintained?
Given that a company does specify standardized work and define procedures properly, how
does it prevent them from drifting? I made a series of observations regarding this very
problem, which I have categorized in Chapter seven.
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5 Clear connections and signals
"No man can serve two masters . . ." --Matthew 6:24
5.1 Links between activities
This chapter considers the third category of my observations: "The ownership of or
responsibility for some tasks is not clear." These observations mostly describe how the links
between activities were working. The links are the connections between the activities- for
example the way a machining cell and the assembly line (its customer) interact. A link
encompasses how the activity is triggered (what signal), what to produce (and how much),
and how the product is moved between the supplying activity and the receiving activity (the
customer). I observed that sometimes the connections between the customers and the
activities were not clearly defined.
5.2 Signals at the cylinders machining area
My first group of observations came from the cylinders machining area. This area machines
cylinders and supplies them to its customer, the assembly line. Once received by the
assembly line, the cylinders are assembled onto the final product: Mighty Motors
powertrains. The assembly line uses about six hundred cylinders per day to meet their
demand, and the machining area is designed to be capable of supplying them.
While I was working in the area initially, I was focusing on aizity improvements: ideas for
improving machining productivity, quality, etc. After some study I realized there should be
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plenty of capacity to meet the line's demand, but at times they failed to meet demand, even
though the machines were working. One day the line shut down for lack of cylinders. There
were actually several cylinders in the supermarket (the finished parts storage area), but they
were not the type required by the line. At that point the manager came to me and asked me
how this could have happened. Why did we have plenty of the wrong kind of cylinder? I
began to carefully study the connections between the customer and the supplier:
" How the machining cell decides what type of cylinder to make next
* How their supplier (powder-coat) decides what to send to them.
First I asked the operators what had happened:
"I thought we were running what we were supposed to be running."
"How do you know what type of parts to run?"
"A printout [the supervisor] gives us, but also what we see- I don't know what happened."
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It appeared to be very unclear how the operators were supposed to decide what type of parts
to run- the link between the assembly line and the cylinders machining area was not
unambiguously defined. In this case the operator had said that the decision was made based
on a printout and also their own observations. I wondered what other signals the operators
might be using to determine what part type to make next. I began to explore every signal
that the operator received telling him/her what to make.
One method that is designed to signal the operator is the supermarket signs (see Figure
5-1).
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Figure 5-1 Signs in cylinders marketplace area indicated desired inventory
levels
The WIP (Work In Process inventory) is stored in supermarkets near the machining area;
each type of cylinder is designated to its own section. Each section is labeled with a sign
similar to the Figure 5-1. On the signs is posted a "max" and a "min" for each type. By
looking at these signs, the operator should be able to see if he/she is ahead or behind. In
the example in the figure, the level of this type of cylinder should never fall below four carts
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(the minimum), and it should never be above six carts (the maximum) of cylinders.
Therefore if the operator sees that one type is at the minimum and other types are at the
maximum, he/she knows to make more of the former. It was less clear how the operator
was to decide what to make in other scenaios. For example if three types were at their
minimums, it was presumably up to the operator to decide which of the three to make next.
In an effort to eliminate the producing of the wrong cylinders, another method of signaling
was installed: a kanban board (see Figure 5-2).
Cylinders
Kanban Green Zone Yellow Zone Red Zone
Board
Type C
Type D
B B B
C C C C
D D
Figure 5-2 The kanban board for signaling the cylinders
operators
machining
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A kanban board is a tool widely associated with TPS and lean manufacturing. Its purpose is
to signal to the operator what parts should be made next. Each batch of parts is represented
by a kanban card. In this case when the machinist finished a batch of parts, he/she would
put a kanban card with the cart of cylinders and then place the cart in the supermarket. The
material handler would then come move that cart of cylinders to the line at the appropriate
time. At some point, the kanban card would get returned to the cylinders machining area
and placed in the proper place on the board. Sometimes the material handler would return
the card, sometimes the operator went to the line to retrieve it, ,and sometimes the
supervisor or the engineer transported the cards. The cards were to be placed at the left-
most position available on that particular part type's row.
The operator could then decide what type to make next based on the kanban board. For
example, if the operator saw the board as represented in the figure, he/she would see type A
in the red zone, indicating type A was the highest priority. He/she would then work on
making cylinder type A, place the card with the completed cart of parts, and place the cart in
the supermarket. Upon returning to the kanban board, the operator would then follow a
similar procedure, looking first for cards in the red zone, then yellow, then green. In this
case, after the A card in the red zone, it was not clear which of the types to machine next,
since all four types filled the yellow zone. In this situation the operator would usually just
pick one of the four types and fill the appropriate order.
Occasionally the operators noted some difficulties in using the kanban board. At times the
whereabouts of some cards were unknown and this made using the board for decision
making less reliable. One operator explained, "I like the [kanban board], but you can't really
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trust it all the time. Sometimes the cards get lost- so I just walk over to the supermarket
and count the carts to make sure it's right."
In order to make sure the operators were making the right parts, the supervisors would often
meet with the operators to communicate the expected production. At the beginning of the
shift the supervisor of the previous shift sometimes told the operators what parts were most
needed. Later in the day the operators' direct supervisor would sometimes bring bya list of
needed parts. If the supervisor noticed a part type was dangerously low he would
communicate this to the operators so they could work on that part right away. In one
incident, I was working in the area when the supervisor arrived from an emergency planning
meeting. "I just found out we're going to need a ton of [type B] parts. So for the rest of the
day don't worry about the kanban board and just make [type B]."
Another time while I was in the cylinders area, the material handler came directly to the cell
(rather than to the supermarket as normal) to pick up a half-filled cart of type C. "Keep
making [type C]" the material handler said. The operator pointed out that they were also
low on type D. But the material handler replied, "I just talked to the scheduler, and they
won't be making any more [type D] today- so keep cranking on the [type C]s."
I noticed that in the supermarket there were two carts of completed parts from an older
model [Type E] that had not been used in several months. I discovered that the parts were
seldom used by the assembly line and no request had been sent for them, but two batches
were machined nonetheless.
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Table 5-1 Conflicting signals at cylinders machining area
Signal 1 Signal 2 Operator response Actual Customer
Need
Kanban - Type A Supervisor - Type B Type B
Supermarket - Type D Material Handler - Type C
Type C
Kanban - no order Supermarket -- Type E Type E none
After observing the various signals that the operator had to consider in deciding what to
make next, I mapped the process out by hand (see Figure 5-3):
2 - Current Condition:
LA.
Figure 5-3 Diagram of multiple signals at cylinders machining area
5.3 Signals at flywheels cell
In other areas, I observed similar connections where the signal between the supplier and the
customer was not clear. In the flywheel area, I asked the operator how they knew when to
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make parts for their customer (an assembly station). "They should have sixty flywheels
always ready at the next area. Sometimes they tell us they need more; sometimes we see
they're short. Either way... " According to the operator, the signal for more flywheels was
triggered in at least two ways: by the supplier's observations or by communication initiated
by the customer.
5.4 Signals at gears machining area
While interviewing a supervisor of the gears machining area, I learned they had links that
occasionally failed to send (or respond to) the proper signal. The supervisor explained to me
that they shut down the line "because we didn't have all the parts ready when the material
handler came. So they should have been hand delivered to the line by somebody, but we
dropped the ball on that. Somewhere we failed to communicate." In this case rather than
several signals being sent, no signal was sent.
5.5 Clear unambiguous connections
At Toyota, the connections and signals are highly specific in their design. Toyota's rule is:
"Every customer-supplier connection must be direct, and there must be an
unambiguous yes-or-no way to send requests and receive responses . . ."
"Every connection must be standardized and direct. .. The rule creates a supplier-
customer relationship between each person and the individual who is responsible for
providing that person with each specific good or service. As a result, there are no
gray zones in deciding who provides what to whom and when. When a worker
makes a request for parts, there is no confusion about the supplier, the number of
units required, or the timing of the delivery." (Spear and Bowen 100)
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In each of the Mighty Motors cases above the workers were trying to help to communicate
what the cell should be making next. But in trying to help by increasing communication,
they contributed to the creation of an extremely ambiguous signaling systen. Part of the
problem is when it is everybody's job to communicate, it is nobody's job. In some cases this
means everybody communicates (as in the cylinders example), in other cases nobody
communicates (as in the gears example). In the latter case, there was no specified person to
deliver the gears to the line when the material handler's delivery run was missed, so the gears
were not delivered; nobody communicated because it was everybody's job. Intuition might
tell us that the more signals the better- that increasing communication is the same as
improving communication. But these examples all show that a higher quantity can actually
cause a decrease in the quality and clarity of the connections.
Without this clear, unambiguous signal, the operators are forced to make decisions based on
conflicting data. These decisions then stray from the actual desired response of their
customer. For example I found that when the cylinder machining operators had conflicting
signals and were left to choose which cylinders to machine, they usually chose the smaller
silver cylinders because they are lighter for handling. My supervisor developed an
explanation for this phenomenon which we termed Gluside 's theonm "People are like
electrons- they take the path of least resistance" (Glusick) Without clear, specific,
unambiguous signals, the system will also take the path of least resistance, falling away from
the ideal and failing to sustain the designed outcome.
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6 Continuous Improvement Everyone Everyday
"Continuous improvement beats postponed perfection."
6.1 How changes are implemented
The next category of observations pertains to howimprovements were being implemented on
the floor. The summary of these observations is: "The operator and the manager expect
different outcomes from a change." In this chapter I explore some improvement projects:
what tools were implemented, why they were chosen, and how they were implemented.
There seemed to be various approaches to making change on the factory floor. I observed
several styles and tried a few of my own. I measured results where possible, and asked
operators about their experiences as well.
6.2 A project in the material handling group
Early on, I learned of a recent improvement project in the material handling group, and I
interviewed those involved to learn how it turned out. This group was in the process of
standardizing their work so that every run to deliver parts followed a specified path. One
step in that process was to develop a kanban-type check sheet with information specifying
the path as well as space to manually record the outcome. The engineer designing the check
sheet came up with her own design and gave it to the material handlers to use. At first the
material handlers did not like the one page check sheet presented and proposed their own
two page version. The engineer naturally thought her own design was better, but agreed to
the alternative. After using their own version for a week, the material handlers modified the
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check sheet to be one page again: a hybrid containing the format of the second, but on one
page similar to the first. The material handlers were excited about their new method and
pleased with the improvement: "We think it worked well because they actually came and got
our input- asked what we thought at the beginning."
6.3 A project in the powder-coat area
One of the first implementation projects I helped with was installing a kanban board in the
powder-coat area. I attended a meeting with the mangers, engineers, and operators from
powder-coat where the plan was discussed. Some of the operators had been selected to tour
through a nearby facility where a kanban system had been successfully implemented, and
they talked about that. Some operators were open to the idea of a kanban board in their
area, but a lot of opposition was expressed as well. Afterwards, a few of us met to discuss
the outcome of the meeting. One manager said, "The challenge I have is implementing a
system that I know is the right thing to do without [the operators'] opposition!"
Several kanban boards were purchased: one for the powder-coat area and additional ones for
other areas (such as cylinders) to be implemented as well. When the first order of kanban
boards arrived, one was placed in the powder-coat area and a meeting was called to explain
how the board should be utilized. After the meeting and the installation, I spent some time
in the area to observe how it was working.
First I asked the operators how it worked- how they decided which cards to grab --and
therefore which parts to load- next. The first operator responded, "The order doesn't
make a difference- you just grab them." The second operator explained, "No, you're
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supposed to grab them left to right." After some discussion they both agreed that they were
supposed to be grabbed from left to right.
One of the senior operators was responsible for maintaining the board and ensuring the
cards were not lost. I asked him about how it was working:
"This system is so confusing. They [Management] come down and tell us to use this
[kanban board] saying it would make things easier, but it's more work. Now I have
to go count parts and cards every day. And sometimes the [supervisor] comes and
tells us to make something totally different than what the cards say!"
After the installation of the kanban board in the powder-coat area, a second board, nearly
identical to the first, was installed in another machining area. One of the operators came to
me unsure of the board's origin or its expected benefits, "I can't be shuffling cards all day- I
can't remember what cards go where for every area. My biggest gripe is that no one came to
our group and asked for input. They never asked what we thought about it."
6.4 Input from operators
A key difference in these two improvement implementation scenarios is that in the first
example the engineer solicited and appliai the input of the operators, using it in a trial run. In
the second example, a tool that the engineer knew was the right tool was installed in the
operators' area. Based on the attitudes expressed in the quotes above from the operators,
they were much more content (and more cooperative) with the first method. A less intuitive
result is that the first method yielded more a more successful outcome as well. I learned
from these initial examples; throughout my remaining projects at Mighty Motors upon first
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beginning work in an area my first step was to ask the operator what improvements they
recommended.
Toyota believes this approach to solving problems yields additional benefits by educating the
employees:
"Toyota's managers don't tell workers and supervisors specifically how to do their
work. Rather, they use a teaching and learning approach that allows their workers to
discover the rules as a consequence of solving problems. For example, the
supervisor teaching a person ... will come to the work site and, while the person is
doing his or her job, ask a series of questions . . . This continuing process gives the
person increasingly deeper insights into his or her own specific work ...
Consequently the Toyota Production System has so far been transferred successfully
only when managers have been able and willing to engage in a similar process of
questioning to facilitate learning by doing." (Spear and Bowen 103)
There seem to be plenty of disincentives against trying this approach to making
improvements on the factory floor. These disincentives are similar to the barriers that
prevent managers from spending time on the floor (see Chapter 3). It can seem more
strenuous and sometimes more expensive for the engineer or manager to work with the
operators on improvement ideas. But I found that the approach of asking questions and
soliciting ideas from the operators brings overwhelming advantages in the long run.
In my projects this approach yielded many more improvement ideas than I had been able to
conjure up on my own. For example in my first visit to an assembly line station I spent a
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few cycles watching the operator and thinking of possible improvements in the process.
After three cycles of observing and not having developed any significant improvement ideas
on my own, I asked the operator what things he thought could be changed to improve the
area. His response was enlightening:
"I don't really think there's much that could be changed- it's been this way for a
long time ... Although it would be nice if these drills were mounted together
because they get scattered and I have to spend time retrieving them every few cycles .
. . And if this rack were closer to me I wouldn't have to turn so far to get those
screws every time ... And I'd love to have these brackets stored on this shelf instead
of the one far away. ..
In less than a three minute cycle the operator progressed from claiming no ideas to
providing three great ideas (which we eventually tested and implemented) for improving his
area.
This example demonstrates how profoundly the operators generally know their jobs. In this
case the operator had been working on this job for seven years, repeating the same cycle
(approximately) every three minutes. During that time he has thought about how the
process could be done better. By asking questions about his work, I gave him the
opportunity to think deeply about those ideas and then to verbalize them.
Part of the meaning of the Mighty Motors philosophy "People are key" is the paradigm that
the people are the greatest asset. They have knowledge that can be utilized by the company
for making improvements. When I asked for and used that knowledge I was more
productive than when I tried to choose implementation projects independent of the
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operators. I found that once I began to ask operators for ideas and to help them to try those
ideas, it created a pull for improvements. For example the operator in the neighboring
assembly station saw I was helping the rocker-box area and asked for help in her area. After
some positive changes there, she recommended me to her friend further down the line who
also had some ideas for improving his assembly station.
Another advantage to this "improvement by pull" approach (the pull that is created by
asking the operator) is the development of a relationship of trust. By receiving help that
they requested, they were more willing to help with projects that did not directly benefit
them but did benefit the system. For example after receiving help with some changes that
she had requested, the rocker-box assembler agreed to cooperate on a project that she had
previously opposed. Together we rearranged her area for the benefit of the material
handlers- a project that added slightly to her work but drastically reduced the work of the
material handlers.
6.5 The A3 and the scientific method of improvement
While it is important to try ideas from operators, it is clear that not every improvement idea
(whether provided by operators, engineers, or otherwise) will yield positive results. So how
does one decide which ideas to implement? In trying to answer this question I learned the
application of the Mighty Motors tool called the "A3." The A3 (so named because it is
written on a standard A3 - 11" x 17" piece of paper) is a valuable problem solving tool used
at Mighty Motors. It is a form to follow for making changes on the floor in the form of
experiments--after the manner of the scientific method. It takes a problem and forces the
participant to think through that problem scientifically while communicating it simply and
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visually.
Improvement, Experimentation & Learning in Complex Environments
1 - Business Case ] [5 Target Condition:
2 - Current Condition:
3 - Problem Analysis:I
4 - Countermeasures: +
6 - Reasoning:
h8 \A/hr Me\uHr \n/hR
8 - Measures and Result:
9 - Learning:
I
Figure 6-1 The A3 method: a scientific method for solving problems
format of the A3 (see figure) contains the following components:
Business Case-- Why is this believed to be a problem in the first place?
How important is this change?
Current Condition--How the process is actually running currently?
Problem Analysis- What is the problem you are trying to solve?
Countermeasures- What changes do you propose to solve the problem?
Target Condition- What is the end point you hope to achieve?
Reasoning- Why do you think these countermeasures will achieve the
target condition?
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___j fU&9Lr
The
1.
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7. Implementation- What is the sequence and timing for your improvement
procedure?
8. Measures and Results- What are the outputs you will measure?
9. Approved- Who needs to be involved? (And does not?) Continue with
their involvement, commitment, and signatures.
10. Learning- Did the outcome meet your expectations? Why or why not?
(Spear 50)
The A3 provides a scientific framework to frequently make simple changes, measure the
effects of those changes, and learn from the experience. By approaching every change as an
experiment, the proof of its effectiveness is in the results. In the kanban board example
from the previous chapter, the use of the A3 method likely would have produced a different
outcome. First of all rather than "knowing" the right tool, the group would have first clearly
defined the problem they were trying to solve and the objective they were trying to achieve.
They could then propose the kanban board (or something else) as a solution. They could
then try that solution through an experiment with a hypothesis and a clearly defined
expected outcome. After testing the hypothesis, measuring the result, and comparing it with
the expected outcome, everyone would be able to see and know if implementing the kanban
board was a good decision. There would be no uncertainty as to the effectiveness of that
particular tool in that particular situation--everyone would know from the experiment's
results.
Note that just as a controlled baseline is crucial for a scientific experiment, a standardized
process is crucial for the A3 methodology. Standardized work is key in maintaining process
stability to provide that baseline. (see Chapter 3). If the operator changes his/her method
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of procedure in the middle of an experiment, it will confound the experimental change and
make it difficult to determine if the measured results are a result of the experiment or the
added variation.
A clear understanding of the current condition is also important. In the same kanban board
example from the previous chapter, the current condition had not been clearly identified
before devising a solution. The problem was assumed to be a lack of communication
between customer and supplier. After firsthand observation, however, it was discovered that
there was plenty of communication, but that there was no one clear signal. Because the
problem was not clearly understood at the beginning, it was actually compounded rather
than resolved. This step in the A3 process ensures the current condition is understood and
the root problem identified before forming a hypothesis.
Toyota follows a similar A3 scientific methodology:
"The Toyota Production System creates a community of scientists. Whenever
Toyota defines a specification, it is establishing sets of hypotheses that can then be
tested. In other words, it is following the scientific method. To make any changes,
Toyota uses a rigorous problem-solving process that requires a detailed assessment
of the current state of affairs and a plan for improvement that is, in effect, an
experimental test of the proposed changes." (Spear and Bowen 98)
The one page, visual approach of the A3 also serves as an effective tool to communication:
"The most time-consuming and difficult way to understand complex ideas is to have
to decipher a lengthy report filled with technical descriptions, business jargon, and
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tables of data. More efficient is the visual approach- 'a picture is worth a thousand
words.' Acting on the fact that people are visually oriented, new employees at
Toyota learn to communicate with as few words as possible and with visual aids.
The A3 report ... (in which all necessary information to make a complex decision is
presented on one 11" x 17" piece of paper) is a key part of the process of efficiently
getting consensus on complex decisions." (Liker, 244)
By structuring problems by hand with the A3 format, all the most relevant information is
visible on one sheet of paper. No additional time needs to be spent making PowerPoint
slides!
The use of the A3 and its scientific pattern for solving problems also engenders an attitude
of open-mindedness to discovering the truth. This helps lead to cooperation from all the
people involved. The groups involved are likely to develop a willingness to scientifically
discover zhat is right rather than zebo is right. In one example, I learned that a particular
supermarket (inventory storage area) had been identified as poorly organized. Parts were
often stored irregularly with disregard to the labels in the area. As I discussed the problem
with the operators, I learned that the signs used as labels were inconsistent and difficult to
read. One operator told me, "We don't really use the marketplace much- it's more of a
dumping ground. These signs are too confusing with small print- [It's difficult] to read
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those little signs every time."
Figure 6-2 Original supermarket signs in cylinders area
As part of my plan to reorganize the supermarket I began to develop new signs that I
hypothesized would eliminate the ". . . confusing with small print" problem. I asked the
operators what parts of the sign were most important- what information they looked for
when they looked at a sign to retrieve or replace parts. I discovered that they primarily
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referenced the picture and the part name, rather than the part number--which was printed in
the largest font. Using their feedback, I created a new, more visual version of the signs that
emphasized the more relevant features.
Figure 6-3 First iteration of new supermarket signs for cylinders area
I was told that I needed approval from the Industrial Engineering group before installing
them on the floor. I set up a meeting with an Industrial Engineer and met to explain my
objective. The engineer's first response was "Oh, you can't change the signs; we've just
finished putting up new signs around the entire factory." I explained that the operators in
this particular area had complained about the signs, and I showed her the new signs I had
designed. "Those are very nice," she said, "but we have one type of sign for the entire
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factory, and we just can't let you change them in one area." Her reasoning was logical, but
having confidence in these new signs I persisted. I asked how she would feel if I put them
up for two weeks as an experiment to see how they worked. I promised that I would get
feedback from the operators and engineers to see which ones they thought were more
effective. With that proposal--the fair agreement that we would decide what to do after
learning from a simple experiment- she agreed and the signs were changed. In this
approach, the disagreement is resolved by the results of the experiment, not by debate or
deliberation. There is much less room for opinion and much more room for facts when the
A3 experimental approach is used in making improvements.
6.6 Changes in rocker-boxes area
At one particular station on the assembly line (rocker-boxes assembly), the material handler
was required to make non-standard replenishment runs because the current rack did not
hold enough rocker-boxes. In a previous project an engineer had made some CAD
drawings recommending an entire new rack that provided for more storage space, thus
allowing the material handler to replenish parts during his standard intervals. Rather than
build the new rack, we followed the A3 approach in exploring changes at the station to see if
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we could accomplish the desired result.
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Figure 6-4 Sample A3 of rocker-boxes area
By examining the current condition, I realized there was a surplus in rocker-arms, and that
by consolidating rocker-arms into one shelf there would be enough space for a balanced
supply of all parts, including rocker-boxes. Through experimentation, the operator and I
cycled through various layouts to see which layout would support enough parts without
hurting cycle times. First we moved the rocker-arms to the middle shelf and the bolts on the
table. We tested that layout for several cycles to observe the results and realized that this
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made the rocker-arms stored in the back of the container less accessible. She couldn't reach
them from the new position, and her cycle time increased as she struggled to reach them. So
we pulled the rocker-arms forward out onto the table while moving the bolts to lower side
shelves. After trying that for several cycles we realized that put the bolts to far away and
increased her cycle time. Finally we found some containers to store the bolts on the side of
the table which still left room for the rocker-arms. After running several cycles with this
configuration, we recorded a modestly improved cycle time while also creating the space
necessary for the material handler's rocker-boxes deliveries.
This process of experimentation was different than the CAD drawing approach.
Conventional wisdom sometimes suggests that the most successful changes are those that
are intricately planned- often a change by committee with meetings, discussions, and CAD
drawings. But this example shows that through a simply planned approach--by analyzing the
problem with handwritten drawings and by experimenting on the floor with two people
involved--we accomplished the same goal without the purchase of expensive new shelving.
6.7 Simple, frequent experiments
One advantage of smaller, simpler experiments is the increased rate in learning that results.
In areas where flexibility was a characteristic, we were able to perform several experiments
thereby rapidly improve the area. Areas with less flexibility provided more barriers to
experiments and change, therefore decreasing the rate at which we could learn and improve.
I discovered various examples where flexibility could be gained by making a few simple
changes.
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I experienced some advantages of this flexibility while working on changing those inventory
supermarket signs. After receiving approval from the industrial engineer, I submitted the
sign change request to the maintenance group. The signs hung from the ceiling about nine
feet from the ground and required the help of the maintenance department to change. After
submitting the request, I received a response that I needed to include more information and
a drawing of the desired outcome along with the paperwork I complied and resubmitted
the request. The following week the maintenance helper called me to the area, and I helped
direct him as to the changes to be made.
After changing the signs, I received some feedback from the operators. They liked the signs
better than the previous ones, but they had some more suggestions to try. I changed some
of the colors and fonts, and made a second iteration of signs.
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Figure 6-5 Second iteration of new supermarket signs for cylinders area
Considering my first experience in changing the signs and anticipating that this could be an
ongoing process, I looked for ways to shorten the cycle. This time rather than having
maintenance help me to replace the signs, I had them change the sign holders so that they
were easily accessible without their help. Rather than nine feet above the ground, I had
them lowered to seven feet- accessible to most people without the aid of a lift, yet high
enough to be clear of the fork lifts. Instead of pre-laminated, pre-hole-punched signs, I
found some vinyl holders which protected the paper signs yet were easily changeable.
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Once these changes were made, the lead-time on my iterations decreased drastically. The
first experimental sign change took nearly seven days to complete. Once the changes were
made, the new sign design was in place within the day, and I was able to immediately begin
receiving feedback As the reader can see from the figure, by reducing the change time from
seven days to one, in the same nine day period I was able to learn from and improve on
three iterations of the design.
Table 6-1 Comparison of steps to change signs before and after
modification
First experimental sign change Second experimental sign change
(7 days) (less than 1 day)
Create new signs on computer Create new signs on computer
Print signs Print signs
Laminate and hole-punch Remove current signs from vinyl holder
seven feet from floor
Submit maintenance request Replace with new sheet of paper in vinyl
holder
Meet maintenance on site
Maintenance uses lift to reach ten foot signs
Worker clips cable ties and removes old
signs
Worker attaches new signs to sign holder
with cable ties
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Figure 6-6 Smaller implementation times yield faster learning cycles
I found other areas where by improving their flexibility I could decrease the lead-time for
experiments. On the Assembly line at the rocker boxes station I ran several experiments
trying various configurations for the operator/parts interface. At the beginning the shelf of
each part was labeled by a laminated, hole-punched card which was fixed to the shelf by
cable-tie. The process of cutting the cable-tie then replacing with new cable-ties took two
minutes per sign. In order to facilitate the experiments, we replaced the cable-tied signs with
Velcro backed vinyl sleeves. Now changing the signs took less than ten seconds each. By
decreasing this lead-time (a type of setup time) we were able to rapidly try various
configurations.
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6.8 Worldwide contest in human powered flight
A story from history helps support the conclusion that small, frequent, directed experiments
yield the greatest learning and therefore the greatest success: In the 1970's a worldwide
contest was established with a prize paid to the first group that could build an airplane
capable of taking off under human power and flying for at least a mile. Dozens of teams
entered, taking on this new difficult engineering challenge. Some of the entrants included
institutions such as MIT, Cal Tech, and more. But none of these well-organized theory
shops won:
[The winner was] a group of hobbyists, directed by a businessman named
Paul MaCready, who compensated for their supposed deficiencies in theory
by evolving a design that tolerated repair, and tolerated it generously.
Because the GcssanrrA llffr s could be repaired cheaply and quickly, it could
be stressed to failure, pushed until it crashed, over and over. Each of these
experiments- you couldn't really call them accidents- was a highly context-
sensitive tutorial in the trade-offs possible among strength, weight, and cost.
When a part failed ... that failure did much more than testify to an
inadequacy in the original design: the timing, severity, and path of the failure
underlined the issue needing attention next and pointed suggestively in the
direction of a likely solution. By the time the group claimed the Kremer
prize, the plane had crashed five hundred times. Had they had the time to let
it crash a thousand, The A lhbt-ars might have flown for a week (Hapgood 8-
9)
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6.9 Fast clockspeed
In his book Clkkspax, Charlie Fine gives an example from nature about rapid learning. In
1995, three genetic research scientists won the Nobel Prize in medicine for their work on the
process whereby embryos develop from a single cell into complex adults. In their work, they
examined hundreds of mutations through thousands of lifecycles of fruit flies. Fine explains
why they used fruit flies as the subject of their study:
"Despite their genetic complexity, they evolve rapidly: They go from egghood to
parenthood to death in under two weeks. Fruit flies enable a manifold increase in
research productivity. In a 40-year career in genetics, a scientist studying humans can
barely gather data from a single generation or two before he or she is forced by age
to retire. The life span of the fecund fruit fly, however, is so short that scientists can
study genetic changes in hundreds of generations during a decade. Fruit flies are
what I call a fast-clockspeed species." (Fine 3-4)
6.10 Rapid learning
In both of these stories the team that learned the fastest won. In the first example it was by
choosing a design that leant itself to flexible and easy repair that enabled rapid
experimentation. In the second example it was by creating the right conditions and choosing
a fast clockspeed species that they learned best. Creating a flexible environment on the
factory floor enables a fast clockspeed factory that allows frequent experimentation. These
examples showed that learning through frequent, simple, directed experimentation yielded
the best and fastest improvements. The Mighty Motors Operating System encompasses this
principle with its philosophy "Continuous improvement everyone everyday"
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6.11 Experiments lead to sustainable changes
This philosophy of using the scientific method is a crucial part of Mighty Motors' making
sustainable improvements on the factory floor. Focusing on experimentation rather than
implementation ensures that the change that is made is actually an improvement. The
method requires having a clear understanding of the current condition, forming a hypothesis
of the effects of the change, comparing the measured effects to the expected effects, and
then learning by drawing conclusions. Repeating this cycle frequently increases the learning
and increases the rate of improvement. Following this scientific methodology ensures that
the change is not just a tool implemented for the sake of being a good general tool, but
rather that the change is an experimentally verified improvement.
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7 Help Chain
"A good marriage [or a good factory] is like a good garden: it requires constant weeding"
7.1 How to respond to problems
The final grouping of my observations was entitled "The operator does not receive
immediate or frequent support unless the problem is severe." These observations focused
on the chain of support established to respond to operators on the floor. Once the operator
encounters a problem, what does he/she do about it, and what response do they receive? I
observed that this matter greatly influences how a problem affects the factory.
7.2 Help chain at the assembly line
On the assembly line I observed frequent examples where an operator encountered a
problem sent a signal, and received a response. Each powertrain traveled around the
assembly line on a "J-hook"- a large J-shaped hook moving along a track on the ceiling.
Each J-hook had a red button on it- an andon button. If an operator encountered a
problem during the cycle that prevented him/her from finishing in time, he/she pushed the
andon button.
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Figure 7-1 The andon signals for immediate help on the assembly line
The button sounded an alarm that audibly alerted everyone on the line that there was a
problem, and an electronic sign identified the corresponding station on the line. A helper
then came to help resolve the problem. If the problem is resolved within the next cycle, the
button is released, and all of the J-hooks carry their powertrains to the next assembly station.
If the problem can not be resolved that quickdy, either the J-hook is moved to a side bay
where it will be inspected further, or the entire line is stopped until it is resolved.
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Figure 7-2 Effects on productivity when andon is used
At one assembly station the operator mounted the carburetors onto the powertrains. The
design specified a certain position for the carburetor. Occasionally after mounting the part,
the operator found that it was twisted slightly and did not meet specifications.
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Figure 7-3 A minor problem where andon was not used
In the rare cases that he encountered it, he resolved the problem by manually adjusting the
carburetor then continued with his work. But the problem did not improve; on the contrary
the frequency increased. He mentioned the problem to his supervisor and continued to
manually make adjustments when it arose. After six weeks he had not received a response
regarding the problem, which had become increasingly frequent.
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Figure 7-4 Effects on productivity when andon was not used
With such regular occurrences, the short cycles could no longer afford him time for manual
adjustments. Running out of time in the cycle, he began to push the andon button each time
he found the carburetor twisted. The andon button then sounded the alarm, which was
immediately responded to by the helper. The helper instantly provided help with the
procedure within the cycle time to ensure the product remained defect free. Then having
been alerted to the problem, the helper brought the problem to the attention of engineering
to begin root cause analysis. Within the week the root cause of the problem was eliminated
and the twisted carburetors problem disappeared.
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7.3 Help chain at the cylinders machining area
In a previous chapter, I presented the example of the blower problem in the cylinders
machining cell.
Designed flow of cylinders in
machining area
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Figure 7-5 Designed flow of parts in the cylinders machining area
In that example the built-in blower had failed, so the operator started using a hose to
manually blow off the parts. As a result, the operator kept the down machine from stopping
production but more than doubled the movements during that step of the process. The
unresolved failure of the machine caused the process to drift from the designed standard to a
less efficient--though still producing--process.
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Figure 7-6 Adjusted flow of parts in cylinders machining area
The operator explained to me in an interview that he had actually reported the failure to
maintenance, but that since the response can sometimes take a while, he developed a way to
continue production in the meantime. I checked the maintenance records and found a
record of the repair request from five months earlier. After five months of this work-around
process, the operator began to develop wrist and elbow pain and finally requested injured
leave to recover. He met with the ergonomic specialist who identified the manual blowing
process as the main contributor to the injury. Because of the injury leave request,
management became aware of the seriousness of the problem. Within a week they had
arranged to fix the built in blower, and production resumed as previously designed.
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Figure 7-7 Effect of process deterioration on performance at cylinders
machining cell
I observed a similar phenomenon at the flywheel machining cell. The operator encountered
a dirty filter at a machining tool and called maintenance for a replacement filter at 5:15 am.
A maintenance technician arrived at 7:30 am for a prescheduled filter change on a different
machine. When the operator asked about the first call he had made, the technician replied
that the next shift would likely respond. The operator decided to keep production going
without the filter change: "Now it's 11 am, and nobody has showed up, so I'm just running
the machine dirty [without a new filter]."
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7.4 Successful help chains
These examples are a representative sample of my observations regarding support on the
factory floor. Sometimes problems were quickly communicated and support was
immediately given. Other times the problem remained unclearly communicated and without
resolution. A comparison of the successful versus unsuccessful problem response processes
yields a consistent pattern. I found four factors common to the successful help chain
examples and absent from the unsuccessful ones. My evaluation of a successful help chain
was based on attitudinal data from interviews, the promptness and consistency of response,
and its effectiveness in sustaining maximum production levels. The four common factors
were:
1. Problems were visible
2. A clearly defined help-chain
3. Immediate response
4. Learned from problem.
7.5 Making problems visible
The first key is that problems were made visible. In each of the examples, once the
problems were highly visible they were quickly resolved. When the operator first
encountered twisted carburetors, he mentioned it to his supervisor. But not until the andon
button was pushed and the line was stopped was the problem made visible and urgent
enough to receive sufficient attention. Had the operator pushed the andon button in the
first instance and at every instance thereafter, it would have made the problem visible at the
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very beginning when it was small, rather than allowing the problem to continue until it
became large.
Without exception the problems that stopped production received the highest degree of
attention and support. Smaller, less visible problems were often left unknown and
unresolved until they became significant. An operator explained his recent experiences with
this methodology of problem solving: "If it's a big problem, a hundred people come down
and surround us until it's a small problem. Then they're gone." This methodology of
focusing large resources on the biggest problem at hand is popularly referred to as
"firefighting." Often firefighting became necessary because the problem was not addressed
when it was small and manageable. With time it grew from a small problem solvable by a
few people to a large problem requiring large allocations of resources. Or worse yet
occasionally the problem never grew big enough to be addressed, and it continued to quietly
affect productivity, quality, or safety.
In the cylinders example the operator performed his work-around for five months, steadily
producing below production standards unbeknownst to his managers- the problem was not
yet visible or obvious. Once his injury required injured leave and stopped production, the
problem became extremely visible and the blower was fixed. Had the problem been
addressed immediately, five months of lower productivity and a leave of injury could have
been avoided. A similar cost could have been avoided in the carburetor example--six weeks
of twisted carburetors and wasted motion could have been prevented by earlier detection.
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7.6 A clearly defined help chain
The second key to the successful help chains was a clear definition of the pathway for the
call for help: who to call for help, who will respond, and when. This is similar to the
concept of clear connections written about earlier in this thesis. By regarding the operator as
a customer and the helper (or supervisor) as the supplier, the necessity of a defined
connection becomes clear. The operator is a customer desiring a service from his/her
supplier (supervisor).
1. How should I make a request for help?
2. Who will respond?
3. When will they respond?
4. What will the response be?
A customer (operator) who did not clearly know the answer to these questions was easily
frustrated.
At a factory meeting, the plant manager was reading and answering questions submitted by
operators. One of the questions submitted was: "Who are we supposed to call for
maintenance? We can never figure it out--a different person answers every time!" The
manager responded: "Just use direct connect [the radio] to Maintenance- everyone will
hear and answer." It may seem intuitive that if more people are designated to respond to a
problem then more help will be provided. In my observations however, I found the
opposite to be true. When multiple people received the call, each person could reasonably
assume another would respond. Whereas those processes with one designated helper (for
example in the case of the andon button at the assembly line) provided the quickest and
most consistent response. In those cases the designated helper knew she was accountable
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for responding- that if she did not, no one would--and the operator knew to expect her
each and every time.
Toyota is strict in its adherence to the principle of clear signals and clear accountability:
"Other companies devote substantial resources to coordinating people, but their
connections generally aren't so direct and unambiguous. In most plants, requests for
materials or assistance often take a convoluted route from the line worker to the
supplier via an intermediary. Any supervisor can answer any call for help because a
specific person has not been assigned. The disadvantage of that approach, as Toyota
recognizes, is that when something is everyone's problem it becomes no one's
problem" (Spear and Bowen 101)
In addition to a clearly defined helper, a definition for the expeaed tinE of the response also
proved to be important. I observed operators who, after making a request for help, were
unsure when to expect a response for their call and therefore assumed the call had been
received and would eventually be addressed. I asked a crankcase machinist what time was
expected for a response to his call for help: "They're usually pretty good, but you never
know. Yesterday I called for a CMM machine, and [maintenance] said it would be a while. I
guess they put you on some 'list.' I doubt it actually exists, but that's what they say." The
cylinders machinist demonstrated a similar uncertainty by continuing to run with a broken
blower. He did not know when to expect help- there was no defined response time as
there is on the assembly line--so out of necessity he changed the process. The operator
could have reasonably assumed the signal had been received and the problem was being
resolved. Instead, the request had somehow been lost and no response was produced. Had
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there been a specified response time however, when the operator received no response
within that specified time he would instantly know that NO-the signal had not been
received. At this point the operator would know to escalate the request; then the reason
behind the signal failure could be explored.
Again I refer to the reasoning behind Toyota's philosophy regarding the specificity of
connections. Here it applies to the help chain between the operator (customer) and her
support (supplier):
"Every connection must be standardized and direct, unambiguously specifying the
people involved, the form and quantity of the goods and services to be provided, the
way requests are made by each customer, and the expected time in which the
requests will be met. The rule creates a supplier-customer relationship between each
person and the individual who is responsible for providing that person with each
specific good or service. As a result, there are no gray zones in deciding who
provides what to whom and when ... when a person needs assistance, there is no
confusion over who will provide it, how the help will be triggered, and what services
will be delivered." (Spear and Bowen 100)
7.7 Immediate response
The third key corresponds to the promptness of the response to a request for help. Given
that a specific time is designated to respond to a call for help, I observed that an immediate
response was more effective than a delayed one.
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One key advantage of an immediate response was the preservation of the designed,
standardized work by automatic avoidance of the development of work-around processes. It
may seem counter-intuitive to discourage the independent problem solving of the operator,
especially given the apparent increased difficulty of immediately responding to every
problem regardless of size. But in my observations the unsupported small problems turned
into larger and more costly problems with time. In the cylinders example the operator acted
as an independent problem solver- he encountered a problem, devised a solution, and
found a way to continue production. But this small unsupported and untested change in the
process brought about a decrease in the maximum output of the area as the movement for
that particular step nearly doubled. Safety and ergonomic problems arose which brought
greater costs later on. A stack of inventory formed on the table for a step that didn't
previously exist. And undetected quality issues may have surfaced from an unplanned,
untested manual blow having replaced the automatic one.
This example demonstrates the multitude of costs that could have been avoided by an
inadiate response to the call for help. In the assembly line example, when the andon button
was pushed the helper responded immediately- uithin the c)de tine jthepamos. The
necessary support was given, the identification of the problem was communicated to the
right person, and the twisted carburetors were fixed within a short amount of time. The
support contained two elements:
1. A countermeasure was applied which consisted of the helper aiding the worker to
finish the process and ensure the part continued defect free.
2. A root cause analysis of the problem was begun by the helper to prevent the
problem from occurring again. But in cases where there was no response within the cycle
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time, the operators developed their own work-arounds to keep production going until more
help arrived. In the twisted carburetor case, the undefined response (without the andon
button) did not come about before the problem became so severe that the andon button was
necessary. Whereas when the button was pushed making the problem visible and requiring
an immediate response, sufficient countermeasures were provided, and shortly thereafter the
root cause was found and eliminated.
Toyota profitably applies this same principle of immediate support:
"The requirement that people respond to supply requests within a specific time
frame further reduces the possibility of variance. That is especially true in service
requests. A worker encountering a problem is expected to ask for assistance at once.
The designated assistant is then expected to respond immediately and resolve the
problem within the worker's cycle time" (Spear and Bowen 101)
In deciding how to respond to small problems, it is typical to overestimate the costs of
stopping the line (similar to the andon button's stopping the line) and underestimate the
costs that result from a delayed response. These figures compare the total costs to stopping
the line immediately with the andon button versus allowing the small problem to continue
being resolved by work-around, as in the carburetor case. As shown in the figures, an
immediate response--even the presumably costly response of stopping the line--for a small
problem costs less in the long run than a delayed response. (Cost is represented by the
shaded area- productivity loss times duration.)
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Figure 7-9 Effect of delayed response on productivity
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Many problems continued because of a hesitance to stop the line for a small problem. But
eventually more productivity was lost by the drifted process than would have been lost by a
line stoppage.
Toyota believes that the value of recognizing and resolving a problem immediately
outweighs the costs of stopping the line:
"Of all TPS components perhaps the one receiving most notoriety has been workers'
'ability' to stop the line ... Two points are important to understanding the
economics of stopping the line. First, the unit cost of stoppage depends on
management's reaction to it ... as long as recovery is swift, stopping the line is not
that expensive. What is vital to grasp in this discussion, however, is how costly it is
not to stop the line ... Overall, then, we reach a subtle but crucial insight about TPS:
we can put a number on shutting down the line ... and the "pain" of that is
immediately felt; we have a cost of not shutting down the line which is not
immediately felt." (HBS 7)
Another advantage of an immediate response is the freshness of the information
communicated to the helper. Information regarding the cause of the need for help
deteriorates over time. An obvious example is how the information changes when it must
pass through several people or between shifts before being assimilated (similar to the
telephone game played in grade school- downstream information seldom matches its
original meaning). The flywheel machinist's request suffered from a similar information loss,
and he never received his clean filter. Less obvious but equally fragile is information that
could serve as circumstantial evidence. For instance I observed a cylinder machinist when
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he encountered an extraordinary quality problem with the honing machine in his area. He
called for help and set the cylinder aside, continuing work on other cylinders. By the time
help arrived later in the day, they were unable to recreate the problem. The exact scenario
that had mysteriously produced the defect was gone, and because of the delayed response
the group lost an opportunity to learn from it.
7.8 Learning from each problem
This leads to the fourth common factor which I observed in successful help chains: learning
from the experience. Every call from an operator signals an opportunity to learn. A
problem is a signal from the system that it has yielded something other than the expected
outcome. Any deviation from the expected outcome signals one of two things:
1. The system has changed, or
2. The assumption of that system's output is flawed
In either case, the helper wants to know immediately when the data (the problem) surfaces
so the system and the assumption can be explored. Getting to the root of the problem (by a
series of questioning and investigation) will teach the operator and the helper more about the
system. If the system changed (for example by a machine failure or part defect), the root
cause should be identified and prevented from reoccurring. If after a thorough analysis it is
discovered the system did not change, assumptions about the output of the system should be
revised.
Toyota realizes the value of the fresh, unspoiled information provided by a problem:
"The striking thing about the requirement to ask for help at once is that it is often
counterintuitive to managers who are accustomed to encouraging workers to try to
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resolve problems on their own before calling for help. But then problems remain
hidden and are neither shared nor resolved company-wide. The situation is made
worse if workers begin to solve problems themselves and then arbitrarily decide
when the problem is big enough to warrant a call for help. Problems mount up and
only get solved much later, by which time valuable information about the real causes
of the problem may have been lost." (Spear and Bowen 101)
7.9 Help chain at rocker-boxes area
Based on my learning from these observations, I tried to apply the above principles while
making changes at the rocker-arms assembly station. I was working with the operator to test
various part delivery arrangements. For each experiment I changed the layout to test its
effects on her work and on the work of the material handler.
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Figure 7-10 Plan for rearranging rocker-boxes area
After making the changes for several cycles I observed the operator do the assembly work
according the new layout; everything appeared to be in order. We set the trial period for two
hours, during which time I would be at a nearby station. I asked the operator to call me
directly if there was a problem, and I assured her that I would respond within the cycle time.
At first, everything seemed to be in order, but after twenty minutes I received a call from the
operator and rushed over. When the operator had finished the first container of rocker
arms, she had removed the empty container and the next set of containers did not slide
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down the rollers to replace it as designed.
Figure 7-11 Problem encountered by rocker-boxes operator during
experiment
She immediately called me, and I responded. I was then able to
1. see the problem occur firsthand,
2. help move the parts down within her reach so she could continue working, and
3. learn from the problem and immediately begin working to resolve it.
My being there for instant support prevented the system from continuing in a manner
different than planned. The instant something went wrong, I was notified. In this case I
instantly learned that my assumptions about the system had been wrong, and I immediately
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took countermeasures to correct it. This way the system did not continue without my
learning of and resolving a problem that would have decreased her performance.
7.10 Improvements naturally deteriorate
Manufacturing systems follow the same law of entropy as every other system subject to the
laws of nature. (Remember Glusick's theorem: People are like electrons; they take the path
of least resistance.) The same applies to processes. Toyota knows that "A system will
deteriorate without constant attention!" This is according to the natural law of entropy:
"The natural law: chaos (entropy) increases without countervailing management actions"
(FBS 5-7) Toyota knows that to sustain improvements made to the system and to keep it
from deteriorating, management must stop problems the moment they arise, then working
to prevent them from arising in the first place.
Based on my observations, countervailing management actions through a responsive help
chain was the most important factor to sustaining improvements on the factory floor.
Regardless of the perfection of execution in the implementation phase, without adequate
support afterwards entropy prevailed and the system quickly deteriorated.
In the flywheel cell when the operator encountered a down machine and did not receive an
immediate response, he continued to work on the previous machine. He then stacked the
extra WIP in an area that according to the design was not to hold more than two parts. In
another instance he ran out of the right half flywheel part. After signaling the problem,
while waiting for a response he began work on all the left half flywheel parts, stacking them
high so he could catch up later. This operator was doing his best to be a good worker and
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keep production going. His decisions were logical, but because they were made without
adjacent management support, entropy increased, the system deteriorated, and the designed
improvements were not sustained.
7.11 Proper support required for sustainable improvements
As important as I found this philosophy of a clearly defined, immediately responsive help
chain to be, it was rare to find it implemented along with other process implementations.
And based on my literature research, this help chain philosophy was much less discussed
than other more tool-based philosophies such as just in time, pull, flow, etc. But a TPS
expert explained in an interview the importance of a clearly defined, immediately responsive
help chain: "We have never seen a company make sustainable improvements without
implementing this type of support structure."
7.12 Operators value support
I observed that an unexpected advantage of this kind of support structure was improved
morale. I had intuitively thought that workers would prefer to be more independent and
unbothered by their supervisors. A few interviews made it clear that this was not the case. I
contrasted the reported feelings of operators who were seldom "bothered" by their
supervisors with those who received frequent support. Those that received irregular,
infrequent visits felt as though the supervisors were only interested in monitoring their level
of work, and not in responding to their problems. But those that received dependable,
frequent support from their supervisor reported a more grateful attitude. In an interview
with one such grateful employee, I learned they were organizing a thank you gift for their
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supervisor. I asked why, and one employee responded, "She is the best supervisor I have
ever had because she mponds to acrpbdem." I found this fascinating. The operators did not
praise a supervisor who let them out early, let them relax at work, or left them alone at work
They said that their best supervisor ever was one who responds to their problems. Based on
what is presented here, the best systems ever are those that respond to each and every
problem. By immediately responding to, understanding, resolving, and preventing each
problem, improvements to a system will be sustained.
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8 Conclusions
8.1 Discovering the Mighty Motors Operating System
The purpose of this thesis has been to study the Mighty Motors Operating System as it
pertains to making sustainable improvements by observing the actual processes in action on
the floor. All of the observations, conclusions, and comparisons presented have been made
in an effort to contribute to the learning of Mighty Motors and the development of its
operating system. This learning process that I have followed is part of an ongoing process
similar to the one that led to the Toyota Production System at Toyota: "The Toyota
Production System and the scientific method that underpins it were not imposed on
Toyota- they were not even chosen consciously. The system grew naturally out of the
workings of the company over five decades." (Spear and Bowen 98) The way to discover
and incorporate the most successful operating system--at Toyota, at Mighty Motors, or at
any factory--is to learn by doing on the factory floor. That is what I have attempted through
my research and work at Mighty Motors. In this final chapter I summarize my discoveries
and recommendations for the Mighty Motors Operating System.
8.2 The theme question and summary statement
The theme question I raised at the beginning of this thesis was: "What are our obstacles to
making sustainable improvements on the factory floor at Mighty Motors powertrains?"
Through the "Language Processing Method" I categorized my related observations into five
categories to help answer that question. Each chapter has focused on one of the five
categories:
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1. Sometimes more time is spent discussing problems in meetings than on the floor
observing them.
2. Some aspects of the operator's work are not clearly defined or standardized.
3. The ownership of or responsibility for some tasks is not clear.
4. The operator and the manager expect different outcomes from a change.
5. The operator does not receive immediate or frequent support unless the problem
is severe.
The final step of the "Language Processing Method" is to summarize all five categories into
one statement. My summary statement is: "A high degree of variability in factory operations
and insufficient responsiveness to that variability result in the deterioration of our designed
and implemented improvements." Nearly all of my observations regarding the obstacles to
sustainable improvements relate to these issues: high variability on the factory floor and
awareness of or responsiveness to that variability. So how can Mighty Motors overcome
these obstacles?
8.3 Five conclusions
An evaluation of these five conclusions can provide a framework for Mighty Motors' focus
and future development. Based on these five categories of observations at Mighty Motors, I
recommend the following five steps as a course of action to increase the level of sustainable
improvements on the factory floor. The steps are arranged according to intuitive cause and
effect relationships. I recommend focusing on these activities sequentially as arranged (the
same sequence as the chapters in this thesis):
1. Go to the floor to make firsthand observations.
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a. Before calling a meeting, go observe the problem and determine who needs
to be involved.
b. Develop the expectation that some part of every meeting will be spent on the
floor at the site of the problem (and/or opportunity).
c. Continue observing and questioning until reaching the root of the problem.
2. Standardize all activities (by making them highly specified according content,
sequence, timing, and outcome).
a. Work with the operators to develop one standard way for their procedure;
make that procedure standard across all shifts.
b. Train the operators that when they encounter a problem with the standard
work to stop the work process and immediately call for help rather than
developing a work-around and continuing production in a non-standard way.
c. Involve operator and coach/supervisor in each standardizing/training
activity.
3. Standardize each link to create one clear, direct, unambiguous signal.
a. Define a specific path for each signal from one customer to one supplier,
eliminate all other conflicting or redundant signals.
b. Train the operators that when they encounter an unclear signal to stop and
immediately call for help rather than to attempt to interpret the signal and
possibly do something the customer (internal or external) did not request.
4. Solve every problem and make every improvement in accordance with the A3 and
the scientific method.
a. Begin by making small improvements on the activity level, focusing on
solving problems for the operators.
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b. Build flexibility into the areas and processes to facilitate rapid
experimentation and learning.
c. After developing a clear understanding of the current condition (see # 1),
form a hypothesis, test the hypothesis, measure the results, and derive
conclusions to learn from them.
d. Implement and standardize only those improvements that yield positive
experimental results.
e. Involve the operator and coach/supervisor with every problem/opportunity.
5. Provide sufficient support to the operators by way of a robust help chain.
a. Standardize the expected method, timing, and recipient of each operator's
call for help.
b. Respond immediately to each operator's call for help.
c. Empower the helper to remain with the operator until the problem is
resolved or an appropriate countermeasure is applied.
i. Apply countermeasure to ensure product remains defect free
I. Begin investigation into root cause to prevent recurrence of problem.
8.4 PDCA Cycle of improvement
These recommended steps are very similar to the steps of well known improvement cycles
found in literature such as in The DemingDiirrnion and Gerra Kaizen The first cycle is the
SDCA cycle- Standardize-Do-Check-Act. The second cycle is the PDCA cycle, also known
as the Shewhart or Deming cycle. PDCA stands for Plan-Do-Check-Act, a plan for making
scientific improvements. Shewhart ". . . referred to this circle as constituting a 'dynamic
scientific process of acquiring knowledge."' (Neave 141) As I have suggested in steps two
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and three, (and as was discussed in chapter 4) standardizing the processes before making
improvements is essential:
"In the beginning, any new work process is unstable. Before one starts working on
PDCA, any current process must be stabilized in a process often referred to as the
SDCA cycle . .. Thus, SDCA standardizes and stabilizes the current processes, while
PDCA improves them. . . these become the two major responsibilities of
management." (Imai, 5-6)
An explanation of the steps of PDCA is as follows: "Plan refers to establishing a target for
improvement and devising action plans to achieve the target. Do refers to implementing the
plan. Chak refers to determining whether the implementation remains on track and has
brought about the planned improvement. A ct refers to performing and standardizing the
new procedures to prevent recurrence of the original problem or to set goals for the new
improvements. The PDCA cycle revolves continuously; no sooner is an improvement made
than the resulting status quo becomes the target for further improvement." (Gemba 5)
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Figure 8-1 PDCA Cycle of improvement
The reader will notice the similarity of the PDCA cycle and the A3 method. Both of these
methodologies are parallels of the scientific method. In this case it is applied to the entire
philosophy of approaching improvement in the factory and even in the Mighty Motors
Operating System. The same truth-revealing method applies.
8.5 Sustaining Improvements
Following this cycle should yield sustained improvements in the factory as seen in Figure
8-2. (contrasted with Figure 1-6):
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Figure 8-2 Comparing sustained improvement with improvement decay
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8.6 Relating the five conclusions to the four high-level MMOS
philosophies
I mentioned at the beginning that I observed a relationship of my conclusions to Mighty
Motor's four high-level philosophies. (see Figure 8-3)
A way of thinking about how we....
Figure 8-3 The four high-level MMOS philosophies
In fact, depending on the interpretation of the meaning of each philosophy, some of them
seem exceptionally similar to my conclusions. "Go see the problem" for example, is directly
supported by my first step: "Go to the floor to make firsthand observations." "Continuous
improvement everyone everyday" is a philosophy related to step four: "solve every problem
and make every improvement in accordance with the A3 and the scientific method." The
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others have less direct correlation, though they do seem to relate somewhat. I present a
table to examine the relationships.
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Table 8-1 Relationship between the four high-level MMOS philosophies and
the five conclusions of this thesis
Four High-level People are One by one Go see the Continuous
philosophies: key approach to problem Improvement
customer every one every
demand day
Five conclusions
of this thesis:
1.Go to the floor Be with the Treat every Go see the Improvements begin
to make firsthand people on problem as problem on the floor
observations the floor an
opportunity
2.Standardize all Standardized Provide Standardized Stabilize the
activities work is individual work enables activities to provide
designed support to easy a common basis for
around each process identification improvement
human and each of problems
movement operator
3. Standardize communicate Treat every Observe the Stabilize the links to
each link to create clearly with person as a links provide a common
one direct, your people customer firsthand and basis for
unambiguous to eliminate ask the improvement
signal. confusion operators
how they do
work
4.Solve every Direct Every Firsthand People at all levels of
problem and problem problem is observation the organization
make every solving at an is the best think of a new idea
improvement in removing opportunity source of every day to improve
accordance with overburden to leam data their work
the A3 and the from people
scientific method (operators)
5.Provide Top priority Respond to Being on the Provide support for
sufficient support is response every floor with operators to try their
to the operators to people problem the operators improvement ideas
by way of a robust (operators) individually facilitates
help chain sufficient
support
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8.7 Reviewing the MMOS change model
At the beginning of this thesis I also discussed the existing MMOS change model and
hypothesized that the lack of sustainability came from a secondary focus on the first
preparatory steps of the change model, "Leadership Commitment" and "Prepare the
People." I suggested that a secondary focus on these steps--which relate specifically to the
system architecture as a whole--would be the primary cause of deterioration.
Sustainability' MMOS Change
Model
Create/Improve
Flow
Establish Activity
Stability
Sys
Prepare the
People
Joint
Leadership
Commitme
ctivity Activity
tem Architecture
Figure 8-4 My original proposal evaluating the MMOS change model
Most of my findings supported this hypothesis in that they pertained to system issues such
as conclusions numbered one, four, and five:
1. time spent on the floor,
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4. the procedure for implementing tools, and
5. the organization of the support system.
But two of the conclusions pertain to part of the third square in the model: "Establish
Stability." Conclusions numbered two and three:
2. standardize activities and
3. standardize links
relate to the stability of those activities and links. If I were to redraw the MMOS Change
Model highlighting the areas requiring more focus, it would include "Establish Stability."
Sustainability MMOS Change
Model
Create/Improve -
LinkEstablish Activ
Stabilty 71 System Arc
Prepare the
People
Joint
Leadership
Is.Commitment
ity Activity
hitecture
Figure 8-5 My revised proposal evaluating the MMOS change model
8.8 A new model of MMOS for sustainable improvements
While my conclusions do not contradict the MMOS change model on the basis of their
being related to the system and its activities and links, this still left some uncertainties. Now
instead of two models of MMOS, I had three:
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1. The Change Model,
2. The four high-level philosophies, and
3. My five conclusions.
Based on the relationships explored above, I combined the concepts of these three
frameworks into one model (see Figure 8-6):
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Immediate
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Establish
Stability
____ Sustainable\ __
People are key continuous
improvement
Leadership commitment
to improvement on floor
CM00 Gregory Dibb
Figure B-6 A model of MMOS for sustainable continuous improvement
This model provides an integrated connection for the principles contained in the three
previous models. In this model, one can compare a factory that creates sustainable
improvement to a windmill that creates electricity. The "reliable, immediate support" is the
wind that maintains the power in the system and keeps the bulb lit (or the improvements
sustained). The "blades" of the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle provide the structure for
harnessing the power (or the resources) and transforming it into the valuable result of light
(or improvement). The "1 x 1 approach to the customer" acts as a rudder to provides
direction, just as the ideal of the customer acts to direct our actions in the factory.
"Leadership commitment to improvement on the floor," "People are key," and "Establish
stability" are foundational to supporting the value-adding processes. Without them, the
windmill could not stand on its own, nor be built. And the "Sustainable Continuous
Improvement" is the valuable result. Much like a Mighty Motor engine, all components of
the windmill must be functioning properly in order for the light bulb to glow (for
improvements to be sustained). The absence of wind, or a missing blade, or a "crack" in the
foundation, or a broken rudder will all lead to darkness (or a lack of sustainable
improvements). (Glusick)
A more detailed description of each of the components follows:
1. Leadership commitment to improvement on the floor
a. The leadership must be committed to providing the resources for making
improvements on the floor.
b. This could involve providing additional support help and the willingness to
sacrifice production for production capability improvement
c. This also involves all of leadership spending more time on the floor. (Go see
the problem)
130
2. People are key
a. The belief that people are the number one asset to the company
b. Improvements and standards are made with full consideration for the people
in the company
c. The concerns of people are heard and receive immediate response
3. Establish Stability
a. Minimize variation by standardizing all activities and links as previously
described
4. Continuous Improvement everyone everyday
a. Improvements are made according to the A3 format and PDCA cycle: Plan,
Do, Check, Act. Repeat.
b. People at all levels of the organization are involved in improvements
5. One by One approach to customer
a. Approach every part as if it has an individual customer waiting for it
b. Direct your operations as an approach to meet the customer ideal.
6. Support
a. Respond immediately to the call for help of every operator- treat operators
as customers.
7. Sustainable continuous improvement
a. The result of constant application of all the principles.
8.9 Conclusion
I suspect that my co-workers at Mighty Motors could respond upon reading this thesis that
they were already familiar with these conclusions. Certainly my co-workers (engineers,
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managers, and operators) were my mentors throughout this entire process and have taught
me their understanding of similar principles. Notwithstanding, in this process I have
demonstrated by example the effectiveness of learning by doing. All of these experiences
and observations have led to recommendations that will contribute to improving the Mighty
Motors Operating System. I hope and believe that I have provided significant evidence and
substantial conclusions to make sustainable improvements in the Mighty Motors Operating
System. This certainly shows the value of involving employees at all levels in continuous
improvement projects- so everyone can learn by doing as Toyota has and as I have. I hope
this serves as support for developing the Mighty Motors Operating System- a new way of
thinking about how we do work and how we do change- to accomplish sustainable
improvements at Mighty Motors.
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